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“Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: 
Social Dominance, Implicit Bias,  
Criminality, and Race  
Darren Lenard Hutchinson

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The intersection of race and criminal law and enforcement has 
recently received considerable attention in US media, academic, and 
public policy discussions. Media outlets, for example, have 
extensively covered a series of incidents involving the killing of 
unarmed black males by law enforcement and private citizens. These 
cases include the killing of Michael Brown, John Crawford, III, 
Jordan Davis, Eric Garner, Trayvon Martin, and Tamir Rice.
1
 Reports 
 
 
 Stephen C. O’Connell Chair & Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College 
of Law. I conducted the research for this Article in various stages, and the project has evolved 
over time. During the development of this project, I received helpful commentary from 
participants at various workshops, including the 2013 Yale Critical Race Theory Conference, 
2014 Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference, 2014 Law and Society Annual Meeting, and 
multiple workshops regarding race, criminality, and police misconduct held at the University of 
Florida Levin College of Law during 2014. I thank all of the persons who reviewed this work 
and asked provocative questions. Terry Smith, Carlton Mark Waterhouse, Nancy Marcus, 
Kimberly Norwood, and Jason Nance helped shape my thoughts.  Emily Swire and Spencer 
Winepol provided extremely helpful research assistance. The members of the Washington 
University Journal of Law and Policy provided outstanding editing and made excellent 
recommendations that enhanced the Article. They are a very bright and energetic team of 
editors. I am also thankful for their patience as current events compelled additions to the 
project. Finally, I thank Robert Jerry, former Dean of the University of Florida, for the generous 
research grant that allowed me to complete this project.  
 1. Larry Buchanan, Ford Fessenden, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Haeyoun Park, Alicia 
Parlapiano, Archie Tse, Tim Wallace, Derek Watkins & Karen Yourish, Q&A: What Happened 
in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/ 
us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html (Michael Brown); Radley 
Balko, Mass Shooting Hysteria and the Death of John Crawford, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/25/mass-shooting-hysteria-and-
the-death-of-john-crawford/; Jack Maddox, Florida Teen Dead After Row That Began With 
Loud Music Complaint, Suspect Jailed, CNN (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/26/ 
us/florida-music-shooting/ (Jordan Davis); Deborah E. Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York Man 
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of racially charged police killings of black men have generated so 
much media attention that the Associated Press has named these 
stories the “top news” of 2014.2 
These incidents have sparked controversy because the assailants 
have been acquitted, not charged by prosecutors or grand juries, or 
charged only after sustained public criticism.
3
 In many of these 
incidents, the suspects claimed that they shot the victims in order to 
defend themselves or others from a perceived threat of harm.
4
 Some 
 
Dies After Chokehold By Police, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/ 
justice/ny-chokehold-death/ (Eric Garner); Michael Pearson & Greg Botelho, 5 Things to Know 
About the George Zimmerman-Trayvon Martin Saga, CNN (Feb. 26, 2012), http://www. 
cnn.com/2013/02/25/justice/florida-zimmerman-5-things/index.html?iid=article_sidebar; Elahe 
Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice Within Seconds, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/ 
26/officials-release-video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/.   
 2. David Crary, AP Poll: Police Shooting of Blacks Voted Top Story of 2014, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/Y/YE_TOP_10_ 
STORIES?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT. 
 3. Meghan Keneally, Grand Jury Does Not Indict Officer Darren Wilson in Death of 
Michael Brown, ABC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014); Mark Berman, No Indictments After Police Shoot 
and Kill Man at an Ohio Walmart; Justice Dept. Launches An Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 
24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/24/no-indictments- 
after-police-shoot-and-kill-man-at-an-ohio-wal-mart-justice-dept-launches-investigation/ (John 
Crawford, III); Eliott C. McLaughlin & John Couwels, Eric Dunn Found Guilty of First-Degree 
Murder in Loud-Music Trial, CNN (Oct. 1, 2014) (white male convicted in a second trial of 
first-degree murder in killing of Jordan Davis after first jury could not reach a verdict on this 
charge); J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict 
Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-
eric-garner.html; Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Acquitted in Trayvon Martin 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-
zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all; Sari Horwitz, George Zimmerman 
Charged With Second-Degree Murder in Trayvon Martin Shooting, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/george-zimmerman-to-be-charged-in-trayvon-
martin-shooting-law-enforcement-official-says/2012/04/11/gIQAHJ5oAT_story.html (reporting 
that special prosecutor charged George Zimmerman with second-degree murder in the death of 
Travon Martin; charges come after case sparked national debate on race and policing and after 
original prosecutor, who intended to bring case to a grand jury, recused himself).    
 4. Staff Report, Darren Wilson Said Fight At Car Justified Use of Force Against Michael 
Brown, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
and-courts/darren-wilson-said-fight-at-car-justified-use-of-force/article_95453075-8661-5e47-
ae35-94783d620c6e.html; Jerry Kenney, Community Keeps Calm Despite Questions About 
Wal-Mart Shooting, NPR (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/16/348709429/ 
community-keeps-calm-despite-questions-about-wal-mart-shooting (reporting police view that 
shooting of John Crawford, III, justified in order to protect safety of others, even though he was 
carrying a BB gun that he picked up in the store and which the store sells); Larry Hannan, 
Michael Dunn Testifies in His Own Defense; Jury Will Begin Deliberations Wednesday, FLA. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/8
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media and academic commentators, however, contend that the 
victims’ race caused the suspects’ fear.5  In other words, racial 
stereotypes that depict black men as violent and dangerous, rather 
than actual threatening behavior, motivated the killers.
6
 The racial 
explanation for these incidents and the failure or difficulty to indict or 
convict the assailants has divided the public along historical racial 
lines.  According to many public opinion polls, whites tend to believe 
the killings were justified, while people of color do not.
7
  
 
TIMES UNION (Sept. 20, 2014), http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-09-30/story/michael-
dunn-testifies-own-defense-jury-will-begin-deliberations (reporting Michael Dunn’s assertion 
that he shot Jordan Davis because he feared for his own life); J. David Goodman & Michael 
Wilson, Officer Daniel Pantaleo Told Grand Jury He Meant No Harm to Eric Garner, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/officer-told-grand-jury-
he-meant-no-harm-to-eric-garner.html (reporting that officer who killed Eric Garner testified to 
grand jury that he feared that Garner’s resistance would cause the officer and Garner to crash 
through a glass storefront window); Lizette Alvarez, In Zimmerman Case, Self-Defense Was 
Hard to Topple, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/in-
zimmerman-case-self-defense-was-hard-to-topple.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on George 
Zimmerman’s self-defense argument to justify killing of Trayvon Martin); Abby Phillip, 
Cleveland Cop Said He “Had No Choice” But to Shoot 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice, Father Says, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/02/ 
cleveland-cop-said-he-had-no-choice-but-to-shoot-12-year-old-tamir-rice-father-says/ (reporting 
that white officer told his father that he shot and killed black child because he was reaching for 
a gun, although the gun was fake and officer killed victim within seconds after arriving upon 
the scene). 
 5. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a 
Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 101, 111 (2013) (“Race likely influenced 
Zimmerman’s perception that Martin posed a threat of criminality, whether Zimmerman was 
aware of this or not.”); Judith Browne Dianis, Op-ed, Eric Garner Was Killed By More Than 
Just A Chokehold, MSNBC (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/what-killed-eric-
garner (arguing that implicit racial biases caused officers to harass and kill Eric Garner); 
Patricia J. Williams, Letters from Paris, Madlawprofessor’s Weblog, Dec. 3, 2014, http:// 
madlawprofessor.wordpress.com/2014/12/03/letter-from-paris/ (discussing John Crawford 
killing and arguing that negative stereotypes of black males likely contributed to his death).  
 6. See Lee, supra note 5, at 111; Dianis, supra note 5; Williams, supra note 5. 
 7. Deborah Charles, Big Gap Between Races in U.S. on Trayvon Martin Killing, 
REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/12/us-usa-florida-shooting-
poll-idUSBRE83B1BB20120412 (reporting polling data showing that ninety-one percent of 
blacks, fifty-three percent of Latinos, and 35 percent of whites believe killing of Trayvon 
Martin was unjustified); PEW RESEARCH CNTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Big Racial 
Divide over Zimmerman Verdict: Whites Say Too Much Focus on Race, Blacks Disagree, PEW 
RESEARCH CNTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS July 22, 2013, available at http://www.people-
press.org/2013/07/22/big-racial-divide-over-zimmerman-verdict/ (finding dissatisfaction with 
acquittal of killer of Trayvon Martin among eighty-six percent of blacks, fifty-eight percent of 
Hispanics, and thirty percent of whites); id. (finding that seventy-eight percent of blacks, forty-
seven percent of Hispanics, and twenty-eight percent of whites believe the death of Trayvon 
Martin “raises important issues about race that need to be discussed”); Pew Research Center for 
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These incidents and the resulting national conversation 
surrounding race are critical issues for legal analysis, particularly in 
light of the well-documented history of racism within criminal law 
and enforcement in the United States. Historically, many states 
explicitly discriminated on the basis of race by enacting laws that 
criminalized conduct only if the individual who engaged in the 
activity was a person of color.
8
 Statutes also allowed for harsher 
punishment of persons of color than for whites who committed the 
same crimes.
9
 Even when criminal statutes did not contain racial 
classifications, legal authorities often enforced these laws more 
vigorously against defendants of color.
10
 Furthermore, the rigor of 
criminal law enforcement also varied depending upon the race of the 
victim. Generally, white victimhood sparked harsher legal 
punishment than criminal conduct that harmed persons of color.
11
 
Allegations of criminal behavior involving white victims and black 
defendants often led to the harshest punishments, prosecutions 
marred by gross deprivations of Due Process and Equal Protection, 
guilt assessed by biased jurors and judges, and, in many instances, 
 
the People & the Press, Sharp Racial Divisions in Reactions to Brown, Garner Decisions, Dec. 
8, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/08/sharp-racial-divisions-in-reactions-to-brown-
garner-decisions/ (reporting that eighty percent of blacks and twenty-three percent of whites 
disagree with the grand jury decision not to indict the officer who killed Michael Brown); id. 
(finding that ninety percent of blacks and forty-seven percent of whites disagree with the grand 
jury decision not to indict the officer involved in the killing of Eric Garner); id. (finding that 64 
percent of blacks believe that race was a “major factor” in the grand jury’s decision not to indict 
the killer of Michael Brown, while 60 percent of whites believe that race was “not a factor at 
all”); id. (finding that 62 percent of blacks believe that race was a “major factor” in the grand 
jury’s decision not to indict the officer involved in the killing of Eric Garner, while forty-eight 
percent of whites believe that race was “not a factor at all”). 
 8. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 26 (1998) (“It was a crime . . . for 
blacks to do all sorts of things deemed to be permissible or admirable when done by others.”). 
 9. Christopher R. Adamson, Punishment after Slavery: Southern Penal Systems, 1865–
1890, 30 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 555, 555–69 (1983) (discussing racially disparate treatment of 
white and black offenders). 
 10. N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the 
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1330–41 (2004) (discussing, in the context of 
black males, how racism and racial stereotypes deprived defendants of due process and equal 
justice). 
 11. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 29 (“Deliberately withholding protection against 
criminality (or conduct that should be deemed criminal) is one of the most destructive forms of 
oppression that has been visited upon African-Americans.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position” 27 
 
 
summary punishment of the allegedly culpable person of color by 
lynch mobs—often with the complicity of state governments.12  
Although facially discriminatory crime and punishment would 
violate the Constitution today, historical patterns of racist criminal 
law enforcement continue.
13
 Many white Americans believe that they 
live in a post-racial society.
14
 Academic research and other data 
repeatedly disprove this perception.
15
 Racial inequality and racial 
discrimination remain prominent features of contemporary American 
society.
16
 
Researchers have tried to explain why racism persists in a society 
with legal and cultural norms that mandate racial egalitarianism. 
Research on implicit bias, conducted primarily by sociologists and 
social psychologists, finds that racism persists in the United States 
because people discriminate due to nonconscious stereotypes 
 
 12. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 30–36 (discussing failure of states to punish white 
perpetrators of violence against black slaves); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 41–49 (discussing 
severe sanctions for blacks accused of certain crimes against whites). 
 13. Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities 
in the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 274 (2010) (discussing 
contemporary racial disparities in criminal law and enforcement); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 536, 541 (1942) (“When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed 
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as 
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive 
treatment.”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)). 
 14. See Richard P. Eibach & Thomas Keegan, Free at Last?: Social Dominance, Loss 
Aversion, and White and Black Americans’ Differing Assessments of Racial Progress, 90 J. 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 453 (discussing opinion polls showing dramatic 
difference between black and white opinions regarding the existence of racial discrimination); 
Elijah Anderson, Duke W. Austin, Craig Lapriece Holloway & Vani S. Kulkarni, The Legacy of 
Racial Caste: An Exploratory Ethnography, 642 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
25, 37 (2012) (summarizing different views whites and blacks hold with respect to the 
contemporary significance of racism); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 918, 919 n.4 (2009) (citing numerous studies finding dramatic differences 
among whites and persons of color regarding the ongoing significance of race); Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva & David Dietrich, The Sweet Enchantment of Color-Blind Racism in Obamerica, 
634 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. at 190 (“It has become accepted dogma 
among whites in the United States that race is no longer a central factor determining the life 
chances of Americans.”). 
 15. Hazel Rose Markus, Claude M. Steele & Dorothy M. Steele, Colorblindness as a 
Barrier to Inclusion: Assimilation and Nonimmigrant Minorities, 129 DAEDALUS 233, 242 
(2000) (discussing the persistence of racial inequality in the contemporary United States). 
 16. Id. 
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regarding persons of color.
17
 This research finds that “implicit” racial 
stereotypes impact how members of racial groups respond to 
outsiders.
18
 The implicit bias scholars contend that “ingroup” 
members treat “outgroup” members worse than individuals in their 
own racial class.
19
 Although researchers have made this finding with 
respect to all racial categories, they have also concluded that 
members of socially marginal racial groups typically respond more 
positively to individuals who are privileged by racial hierarchy.
20
 For 
instance, racial minorities favor whites more than whites favor 
persons of color.
21
 Because whites remain the dominant social class 
in the United States, their ingroup preferences, if acted upon, could 
cause discriminatory treatment of persons of color even in the 
absence of conscious bias.
22
 If these negative racial stereotypes 
continue to influence behavior, the implicit bias theory offers a 
scientific explanation for the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in 
a society that favors formal racial equality.   
Legal scholars and social scientists argue that implicit bias 
explains strong racial disparities in numerous social contexts that are 
bound by legal antidiscrimination requirements.
23
 These settings 
include public education,
24
 employment,
25
 elections and voting,
26
 and 
 
 17. Many social scientists use “nonconscious” and “unconscious” interchangeably. See, 
e.g., ANASTASIA EFKLIDES & PLOUSIA MISAILIDI, INTRODUCTION: THE PRESENT AND THE 
FUTURE IN METACOGNITION, IN TRENDS AND PROSPECTS IN METACOGNITION RESEARCH 
(Efklides & Plousia eds. 2010) at 2 & n.1; Anthony J. Marcel, Conscious and Unconscious 
Perception: An Approach to the Relations between Phenomenal Experience and Perceptual 
Processes, 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 238–300 (1983) (using the terms interchangeably 
throughout article); Lawrence E. Williams, John A. Bargh, Christopher C. Nocera, & Jeremy R. 
Gray, The Unconscious Regulation of Emotion: Nonconscious Reappraisal Goals Modulate 
Emotional Reactivity, 9 EMOTION 847–54 (2009) (same). 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 65–80. 
 19. See infra text accompanying note 88. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 91–92 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 89–91. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 93–86. 
 23. See generally IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter ACROSS THE LAW]. 
 24. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism and the Conversation 
about the Racial Achievement Gap, in ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 23, at 115. 
 25. See generally Judge Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Implicit Bias in Employment 
Litigation, in ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 23, at 80. 
 26. Anthony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the 
Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/8
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criminal law and enforcement.
27
  With respect to criminal law and 
enforcement, many scholars assert that implicit racial bias among 
police,
28
 prosecutors,
29
 judges,
30
 and jurors
31
 shape the experiences of 
persons of color.   
The implicit bias literature links past racial discrimination with 
similar behavior today. While implicit racial prejudice might explain 
many contemporary acts of racial discrimination, an exclusive focus 
on bias-motivated individual conduct obscures the complexity of 
racism, specifically, that it is an institution of oppression.
32
 Race is a 
social construct.
33
 Historically, racial construction depicted whites as 
free,
34
 civilized,
35
 and citizens,
36
 while persons of color were 
 
 27. See, e.g., Charles Ogletree, Robert J. Smith & Johanna Wald, Coloring Punishment: 
Implicit Social Cognition and Criminal Justice, in ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 23, at 46; 
Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in ACROSS THE LAW, 
supra note 23, at 230; R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and 
Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2006). 
 28. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and 
Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 427, 429–30 (2007). 
 29. Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior In Communities Of 
Color: The Role Of Prosecutors In Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 425–49 
(2013). 
 30. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (finding 
pervasive implicit racial bias among judges and modest impact on behavior when racially 
primed). 
 31. Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty By Implicit Racial Bias: 
The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010); Justin 
D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and 
Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 309–10 (2010). 
 32. See Mona Lynch, Institutionalizing Bias: The Death Penalty, Federal Drug 
Prosecutions, and the Mechanisms of Disparate Impact, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 100–02 (2013) 
(contrasting psychological and structural accounts of racism). 
 33. Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 34. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the 
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 164 (1998) (discussing historical legal rulings 
that define slave status as antithetical to the essence of white racial identity). 
 35. Joe R. Feagin, White Supremacy and Mexican Americans: Rethinking the “Black-
White Paradigm,” 54 RUT. L. REV. 959, 968 (2002) (“As whites have viewed the social world, 
the racial hierarchy and status continuum run from ‘highly civilized’ whites to ‘uncivilized’ 
blacks. . . .”) (citation omitted); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva “This is a White Country”: The Racial 
Ideology of the Western Nations of the World-System, 70 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 188, 191–92 
(2000) (listing “civilized” as a racial construct developed historically to distinguish Western 
and white nations from non-Western nations inhabited by “barbaric” persons of color). 
 36. See Gross, supra note 34, at 163 (discussing legal construction of whiteness and 
concluding that being a “white man” meant being “a citizen, a civic being”). 
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portrayed as savages,
37
 violent,
38
 promiscuous,
39
 slaves,
40
 and 
foreigners.
41
 According to implicit bias research, these same 
constructs impact how many white Americans perceive persons of 
color today.  
The implicit bias research, however, does not take into account 
the principal motivation for the construction of racial categories—to 
facilitate and justify group domination.
42
 Prior to the Civil Rights 
Movement, white supremacy denied full citizenship to persons of 
color and made them inferior in every aspect of American social 
life.
43
 Persons of color routinely experienced private and state 
violence;
44
 received inferior educational opportunities or no 
 
 37. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outside in American Law and 
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1268 
(1992) (discussing stereotypes of Native Americans as “savage, barbarous, and half-civilized”). 
 38. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: 
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 535 (relating “myth that black men are 
particularly prone to rape white women” to legal and social domination of blacks); Barbara 
Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the 
Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 34 (1996) (relating “myth of the black man as a 
rapist lusting after white women” to legal and social domination of blacks); Dorothy E. Roberts, 
The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 227 (1995) (noting “violently enforced taboo against 
sexual relations between white women and Black men”). 
 39. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 950 
(1997) (“One of the most prevalent images of slave women was the character of Jezebel, a 
woman governed by her sexual desires . . . .”); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: 
Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 
79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 784 (1991) (“White society created myths [during slavery] to justify their 
oppression and exploitation, portraying black women as fecund and promiscuous objects, 
available to satisfy white male sexual desires.”). 
 40. Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women's History and the 
Metalanguage of Race, 17 SIGNS 251, 256–57 (1992) (arguing that blackness was constructed 
to “signify” a “master/servant” relationship between whites and blacks). 
 41. Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 71, 114 (2010). 
 42. Audrey Smedley, “Race” and the Construction of Human Identity, 100 AM. ANTHRO. 
690, 694 (1999) (“‘Race’ developed in the minds of some Europeans as a way to rationalize the 
conquest and brutal treatment of Native American populations, and especially the retention and 
perpetuation of slavery for imported Africans.”); id. (“The creation of ‘race’ and racial ideology 
imposed on the conquered and enslaved peoples an identity as the lowest status groups in 
society.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1854) (discussing the complete social, 
political, and legal domination of blacks by whites). 
 44. Charles David Phillips, Exploring Relations Among Forms of Social Control: The 
Lynching and Execution of Blacks in North Carolina, 1889–1918, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 361 
(1987) (discussing anti-black lynching and execution in post-bellum North Carolina); WILLIAM 
D. CARRIGAN & CLIVE WEBB, FORGOTTEN DEAD: MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST MEXICANS IN THE 
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education at all;
45
 were denied the means for economic betterment; 
did not have political freedoms;
46
 were displaced from their lands;
47
 
and were treated as property for whites to own and subjugate.
48
 If 
historical racism represented the manifestation of prejudice and 
domination, it is possible that these factors also influence racial 
discrimination today. The implicit bias literature, however, neglects 
to consider the subjugating dimensions of racism. Racism does not 
represent the aggregate behavior of unknowingly prejudiced 
individuals. Instead, racism is a structure of oppression and group 
domination.
49
 
 
UNITED STATES, 1848–1928 (2013) (examining the history of lynching of Mexican Americans 
in the American southwest). 
 45. GUADALUPE SAN MIGUEL, “LET ALL OF THEM TAKE HEED”: MEXICAN AMERICANS 
AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY IN TEXAS, 1910–1981 (1987); RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 134 (2d ed. 2004). 
 46. Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
903, 985 (2008) (citing Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering 
the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389, 397 (1985) (“In the South [during the waning 
years of Reconstruction], state and local governments began to use gerrymandering, poll taxes, 
literacy tests, ‘grandfather clauses,’ white primaries, malapportionment, residency 
requirements, property ownership requirements, fraud, and violence to bring about the total 
disenfranchisement of Black voters.”)). 
 47. William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 12–27 (2005) (discussing the taking of Native American lands by European 
settlers in the Americas). 
 48. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (observing that Europeans had considered blacks “so far 
inferior . . . that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit” and 
that “[h]e was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, 
whenever a profit could be made by it.”). 
 49. John A. Powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 791, 796 (2008) (“Structural racism shifts our attention from the single, intra-
institutional setting to inter-institutional arrangements and interactions. Efforts to identify 
causation at a particular moment of decision within a specific domain understate the cumulative 
impact of discrimination.”); John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act 
at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1078 (1998) (“An embedded view of racism adopts the 
modern characteristics of racism and situates racism not simply as inhering in individuals, but 
also in culture, institutions, and societal organization. This view of racism would claim that in 
the United States today, the principal flaw in analyzing racism is the failure to recognize or 
accept this dynamic, structured, systemic, and contextualized nature of racism.”); Kristin E. 
Henkel, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Institutional Discrimination, Individual 
Racism, and Hurricane Katrina, 6 ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUB. POL’Y 99, 101 
(2006) (“Thus, while the study of prejudice and discrimination focuses on the roles of 
individuals and interpersonal processes, racism encompasses institutional, social, and cultural 
processes that serve as an influential backdrop to individual-level perspectives.”). While 
individual biases can contribute to institutional racism, an exclusive focus on individual bias 
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While implicit bias theory has substantially influenced 
contemporary legal scholarship regarding racial discrimination, other 
theories within social psychology could help scholars develop a more 
nuanced understanding of racial inequality. In particular, scholarship 
that examines the institutional or systemic nature of racism could 
complement implicit bias research and its primary focus on 
individual decision-making.  
Among other schools of thought within social psychology 
literature, “social dominance theory”50 offers a lot of promise.  Social 
dominance theorists contend that human societies inevitably organize 
into groups and that these groups are arranged relationally as 
dominate and subordinate.
51
 Powerful groups create social norms that 
preserve their advantaged status and their access to superior 
resources, such as safe and clean housing, quality healthcare, wealth, 
and political power.
52
 Subordinate social groups, by contrast, tend 
only to have access to inferior social resources, including 
nonperforming schools, unsafe neighborhoods with poor housing 
stock, low-quality healthcare, and limited political power.
53
 Social 
dominance theorists also argue that privileged groups create 
“legitimizing myths” that justify the unequal distribution of 
resources.
54
  
Law is an important instrument of social domination. 
Constitutional law doctrines, for example, make it extremely difficult 
for persons of color to challenge racial discrimination, but impose 
few barriers for whites who wish to contest the legality of racial 
egalitarian remedies.
55
 Criminal law and enforcement also help to 
 
cannot explain the dynamics of racial hierarchy. See Henkel et al., at 101 (distinguishing 
prejudice and institutional racism). Limiting analysis to individual bias also obscures the power 
differentials that exist among racial groups. See Henkel et al., at 101.  
 50. See generally JAMES SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE (1999). 
 51. Id. at 31. 
 52. Id. at 31–32. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 45–48. 
 55. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–58 (2013) 
(describing equal protection doctrine as “majority-protective”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 1111, 1113–14, 1134 (1997) (discussing the failure of equal protection doctrine to 
ameliorate inequality); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than 
Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, U. 
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maintain group-based inequality. Blacks and Latinos constitute a 
disproportionate share of people in the United States who have fallen 
within the supervision of criminal law and enforcement.
56
 This 
disparate pattern contributes greatly to the unequal status that persons 
of color occupy in the United States. For instance, racially disparate 
criminalization forces a disproportionate number of blacks and 
Latinos to perform unpaid labor;
57
 deprives them of the right to 
vote;
58
 severely constricts their ability to find employment upon 
release;
59
 impedes their educational attainment;
60
 and often leaves 
them physically injured and psychologically traumatized.
61
 Thus, 
criminalization in the twenty-first century United States perpetuates 
many of the same injuries caused by legalized white supremacy in 
early American history. That the nation now subscribes to formal 
racial equality does not alter these similarities. Indeed, some social 
dominance scholars contend that incarceration, just one aspect of 
criminal law and enforcement, is the most consistent example of 
group domination in the United States and in most other human 
societies.
62
 Social dominance research, therefore, could strengthen 
the scholarly analysis of racism within criminal law and enforcement.     
 
ILL. L. REV. 615, 637–81 (2003) (contending that the Court provides the most protection to 
privileged classes). 
 56. Tonry, supra note 13, at 274 (discussing disparate treatment of Blacks in criminal law 
and enforcement); Angela J. Davis, In Search of Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 824 (2013) (discussing disparate arrest rates of Black and 
Latino males). 
 57. Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 SEATTLE U.L. 
REV. 870, 891 n.135 (2012) (critiquing coerced labor by inmates). 
 58. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). 
 59. Christy A. Visher, Sara A. Debus-Sherrill & Jennifer Yahner, Employment After 
Prison: A Longitudinal Study of Former Prisoners, 28 JUST. Q. 698–712 (2010) (finding that 
“nonwhite ex-prisoners in this sample had poorer employment outcomes and may have 
experienced discrimination in their search for jobs after release”). 
 60. David S. Kirk & Robert J. Samson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational 
Damage in the Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOC. EDUC. 36, 54 (2013) (“Our analysis shows that 
arrest in adolescence hinders the transition to adulthood by undermining pathways to 
educational attainment.”). 
 61. Jason Schnittkera, Michael Massoglia & Christopher Uggena, Incarceration and the 
Health of the African American Community, 8 DU BOIS REV. 133, 137 (2011). 
 62. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 50, at 202 (“If, on their first visit to Earth, 
extraterrestrial beings wanted some quick and easy way to determine which human social 
groups were dominant and subordinate, they would merely need to determine which groups 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:23 
 
 
This Article contends that implicit bias theory has improved 
contemporary understanding of the dynamics of individual bias. 
Implicit bias research has also helped to explain the persistent racial 
disparities in many areas of public policy, including criminal law and 
enforcement. Implicit bias theory, however, does not provide the 
foundation for a comprehensive analysis of racial inequality. Even if 
implicit racial biases exist pervasively, these biases alone do not 
explain broad societal tolerance of vast racial inequality. Instead, as 
social dominance theorists have found, a strong desire among 
powerful classes to preserve the benefits they receive from 
stratification leads to collective acceptance of group-based inequality. 
Because racial inequality within criminal law and enforcement 
reinforces the vulnerability of persons of color and replicates 
historical injuries caused by explicitly racist practices, legal theorists 
whose work analyzes the intersection of criminality and racial 
subordination could find that social dominance theory allows for a 
rich discussion of these issues.  
This Article proceeds in four principle parts. Part II analyzes the 
general theory of implicit bias and provides examples of its use in 
legal scholarship, including debates regarding criminal law and 
enforcement. Part II also discusses some academic critiques of 
implicit bias research and responses to those criticisms. Part II 
concludes by discussing the limitations of using implicit bias in legal 
analysis. Specifically, by focusing on the unwitting discriminator, 
implicit bias literature fails to account for the structural dimensions of 
racism.  
Part III encourages legal scholars to consider other social 
psychology research that could complement the use of implicit bias 
theory. In particular, social dominance theory, which explains the 
persistence of group hierarchy across human societies, could help 
legal scholars to elaborate the role of criminal law and enforcement 
in facilitating racial subordination.  
Part IV draws upon empirical research and specific incidents of 
violence against black men and demonstrates the shortcomings of 
legal scholarship that relies exclusively on implicit bias theory to 
 
were over- and underrepresented in societies’ jails, prison cells, dungeons, and chambers of 
execution.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position” 35 
 
 
explain racial inequality in contemporary criminal law and 
enforcement. Part IV then argues that legal theorists should utilize 
implicit bias and social dominance theories in tandem in order to 
develop more comprehensive explanations of and remedies for racial 
disparities within criminal law and enforcement.  
II. IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE LAW  
Legal scholars have increasingly turned to social psychology 
literature to construct solutions for legal problems.
63
 For example, the 
use of social psychology research has greatly impacted 
antidiscrimination scholarship.
64
 Implicit bias theory is the most-
utilized field of social psychology research by contemporary 
antidiscrimination scholars. 
A. Implicit Bias Theory 
Implicit bias theory derives from social cognition research. 
Cognitive and social psychologists have found that “many mental 
processes function implicitly, or outside conscious attentional 
focus.”65 Indeed, substantial empirical research demonstrates that 
human “thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped by factors residing 
largely outside conscious awareness, control, and intention.”66  
Cognitive theory suggests that “implicit attitudes” and “implicit 
stereotypes” exist beyond the awareness and control of individuals.67 
An implicit attitude refers to an unconscious preference for a 
particular “social object.”68 Social cognition theorists contend that 
implicit attitudes represent “traces of past experiences” that inform 
and shape actions and preferences prospectively.
69
 Anthony G. 
 
 63. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 439–42 (discussing use of implicit bias theory to analyze 
employment discrimination, affirmative action, equal protection, criminal law and enforcement, 
and judicial bias).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006). 
 66. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 428. 
 67. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 948. 
 68. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 429. 
 69. Id. 
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Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger discuss a few hypothetical 
scenarios that illuminate the impact of explicit and implicit attitudes 
on human decision-making. In one example, Greenwald and Krieger 
contend that some voters might support candidates because they have 
“favorable beliefs about the candidate.”70 In this situation, a vote for 
the candidate indicates “explicit” attitudes. Other individuals, 
however, might support a candidate without knowing anything more 
“than the candidate’s name.”71 Greenwald and Krieger hypothesize 
that a voter could support the candidate simply because “the 
candidate’s name shares one or more initial letters with the voter’s 
name.”72 The voter, however, is unaware that the candidate’s name 
influenced the decision to support the candidate. Here, the positive 
vote would indicate an implicit “self-favorable attitude” held by the 
voter.
73
 The voter favors her own name, which implicitly influences 
her evaluation of the candidate. Greenwald and Krieger also 
hypothesize that a voter’s evaluation of a candidate’s spouse or other 
family member will likely correspond with the feelings the voter has 
for the candidate.
74
 Although the voter might have very little or no 
information about the candidate’s family member, the voter’s 
positive feelings for the candidate implicitly and positively affect the 
voter’s evaluation of the family member.75  
Another important concept within implicit bias literature is the 
implicit stereotype, which is a nonconscious “mental association 
between a social group or category and a trait.”76 Implicit stereotypes 
can determine how individuals treat members of social groups.
77
 In 
one study, researchers read a series of names and asked participants 
to indicate whether they believed the individual was a famous person 
or not.
78
 Participants falsely rated male names as famous more often 
than female names.
79
 This outcome could indicate that the 
 
 70. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 948. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 948–49. 
 75. Id. at 949. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 949–50. 
 79. Id. 
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participants “associate maleness with fame-deserving 
achievement.”80  
The term implicit bias refers to a behavioral propensity that results 
from implicit attitudes and stereotypes.
81
 The individual’s conscious 
attitudes do not control the choice; instead, nonconscious stereotypes 
or shortcuts embedded in the human mind cause the individual to 
evaluate members of different social groups in a disparate manner.
82
 
Some teachers, for example, might grade students of color more 
harshly than white students who submit comparable work. Negative 
racial stereotypes and attitudes might influence the discriminatory 
grading.
83
 Similarly, a property owner might refuse to rent to persons 
of color due to implicit stereotypes regarding the ability of people of 
color to pay their bills.
84
 Employers could refuse to promote women 
into managerial positions because of implicit stereotypes that portray 
men as better leaders than women.
85
 All of these actions could occur 
even if the individual actor outwardly supports racial or gender 
egalitarianism. In this instance, actions do not reflect conscious 
beliefs.
86
 
Social scientists also distinguish between “ingroup” and 
“outgroup” bias.87 People tend to have favorable views of other 
members of their own social group.
88
 By contrast, they hold less 
positive views regarding outgroup members.
89
 The relationship 
 
 80. Id. at 950. 
 81. Id. at 950–51. 
 82. Id. at 951. 
 83. Id. at 950.  
 84. Id. at 951. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 429 (observing that implicit preferences “diverge from 
the consciously reported preferences and beliefs of the same individual”). 
 87. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 951; Lane et al., supra note 28, at 433. 
Succinctly stated, [i]ngroups are groups to which a person belongs, and outgroups are groups to 
which a person does not belong. . . .” R. SPEARS, INGROUP-OUTGROUP BIAS, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 484 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds. 2007). The types of 
groups depend upon the social categories that exist in a given society. These could include 
“gender, ethnicity, occupation, economic and social position” among others. Id.  
 88. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 435 (stating that “the tendency toward ingroup liking 
appears strong”). 
 89. Id.; Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 952 (asserting that “a positive attitude 
toward any ingroup necessarily implies a relative negativity toward a complementary 
outgroup”). 
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between group status and attitudes, however, varies according to the 
social position of the group. People from more powerful social 
classes, such as whites and wealthy individuals, tend to have very 
low opinions of outgroup members.
90
 By contrast, people from 
marginalized social groups do not typically hold the same level of 
disfavor for outgroup members than persons from dominant classes.
91
 
Furthermore, members of marginalized social groups tend to disfavor 
members of their own group in higher rates than people in dominant 
classes.
92
 The negative social construction of the marginalized group 
likely causes its members to disassociate positive traits from ingroup 
membership.
93
 The ingroup and outgroup nature of bias has serious 
implications for race relations. Because whites control most of the 
powerful institutions within the United States, whites’ ingroup 
preferences could deprive persons of color of opportunities for 
advancement.
94
 
B. Measuring Implicit Bias 
1. The IAT 
Researchers have developed several methods to detect whether 
implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes impact the way a person 
behaves. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is the most well-known 
 
 90. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 433–34. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 959 (suggesting that lack of ingroup 
preference among blacks could result from the “influence of the United States’s pro-European-
American culture”). 
 94. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 
HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 477, 490 (2007) (observing that there are “strong reasons to believe that 
implicit bias contributes to a serious social problem that denies opportunities to blacks and 
other minorities in America”); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 966 (“In summary, a 
substantial and actively accumulating body of research evidence establishes that implicit race 
bias is pervasive and is associated with discrimination against African Americans.”); Lane et 
al., supra note 28, at 435–37 (discussing studies that find the IAT a reliable predictor of 
behavior); Anthony G. Greenwald, Andrew Poehlamn, Eric Luis Uhlmann & Mahzarin R. 
Banaji, Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III, Meta-Analysis of Predictive 
Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009) (conducting meta-analysis of implicit 
bias research and finding the IAT an accurate predictor of discriminatory behavior). 
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test for assessing the existence of implicit bias.
95
 The IAT directs 
participants to complete two randomly-assigned tasks.
96
 For example, 
the tester could ask participants in the study to press a certain key on 
a computer keyboard if the image of a black person or a word with a 
pleasant meaning appears on the screen.
97
 By contrast, the individual 
would press a different key if the image of a white person or a word 
with an unpleasant meaning appears on the screen.
98
 During the 
second round of testing, the instructions are reversed.
99
 The negative 
words and images of a black person share the same key, as do images 
of white persons and words with positive meanings.
100
 The test 
theoretically reveals implicit bias if the participant has a more 
difficult time completing the assigned tasks when the “categories 
produce cognitive consonance rather than dissonance.”101 In other 
words, a person with implicit bias for whites would complete the test 
with greater speed when white faces are linked with positive 
words.
102
  
2. Laboratory Studies 
Some implicit bias studies attempt to simulate real-word 
scenarios, including matters relevant to criminal law and 
enforcement. “Shooter” studies, for example, ask participants to 
decide whether or not the image of a male on a computer screen is 
holding a handgun or some harmless object.
103
 If the participant 
believes the man is holding a handgun, the participant must “shoot” 
 
 95. Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Louise Murtagh & Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, Using The 
Implicit Association Test And The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure To Measure 
Attitudes Toward Meat And Vegetables In Vegetarians And Meat-Eaters, 60 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RECORD 287 (2010) (“The most well established measure of what have been called implicit 
attitudes is the implicit association test, or IAT.”). 
 96. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 952.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 952–53. 
 99. Id. at 953. 
 100. Id. 
 101. L. Elizabeth Sarine, Regulating the Social Pollution of Systemic Discrimination 
Caused by Implicit Bias, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1365 (2012). 
 102. Id. at 1365–66. 
 103. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 429–30. 
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the target by pressing a button.
104
 This type of study, which many 
researchers have conducted, consistently finds that participants—
including police officers—shoot unarmed blacks with greater 
frequency and speed than unarmed whites.
105
  
3. Implicit Bias: Implications for Legal Theory  
The implicit bias research has many implications for legal 
scholarship and reform. If, as implicit theorists contend, racially 
motivated behavior usually stems from nonconscious brain activity, 
then implicit biases could explain pervasive patterns of 
discrimination that exist in areas such as employment, education, and 
criminal law and enforcement. Also, with respect to criminal law and 
enforcement specifically, the shooter studies might explain why 
unarmed black males are victims of police offers’ use of lethal force. 
Generally, implicit racial stereotypes that portray persons of color 
negatively could also lead to more vigorous enforcement of criminal 
law against them from the stage of policing to sentencing.  
Although implicit bias theory provides evidence that racial 
discrimination within public and private institutions could occur at 
the nonconscious level and produce measurable racial disparities, 
current Supreme Court doctrine rigidly applies the discriminatory 
intent rule. The discriminatory intent rule requires equal plaintiffs to 
prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose and not 
just that the law or administration of the law has a discriminatory 
effect. Court doctrine holds that in equal protection cases, evidence of 
discriminatory impact is only relevant when it is so stark that only 
intentional discrimination could explain the outcome. 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (“The data revealed systematic racial bias in shooting, with faster and more 
accurate responses to unarmed white targets and armed black targets compared with armed 
white targets and unarmed black targets.”); Banks et al., supra note 27, at 1174 (“The shooting 
studies, conducted by several different groups of researchers, all found that shooting behavior 
differed based on the race of the ‘suspect.’ One finding was that images of unarmed Black men 
were more likely to be ‘shot’ than were images of unarmed White men, a result consistent with 
the shootings of unarmed Black men that have generated so much controversy.” (citations 
omitted)); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn & Paul G. Davies, Differentially Dangerous? Phenotypic 
Racial Stereotypicality Increases Implicit Bias Among Ingroup and Outgroup Members, 14 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 569, 577–79 (2010) (finding positive 
correlation between darker racial phenotypes, negative stereotypes, and decision to shoot). 
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Implicit bias theory, by contrast, finds that discrimination takes 
place outside of the conscious intent of the actor. Thus, even if the 
defendant’s conduct is intentional, it still might result from invidious 
stereotyping of social classes. The discriminatory intent rule, 
however, makes arguments regarding nonconscious bias irrelevant. 
Even if the defendant performs a discriminatory act intentionally, 
such as conducting a stop and frisk of a Latino suspect on the basis of 
race alone, plaintiff must still demonstrate that the defendant had the 
specific intent to discriminate on the grounds of some protected 
category, such as race or national origin. 
 Legal theorists have argued that implicit bias research severely 
undermines the legitimacy of the discriminatory intent rule. The rule 
assumes that discrimination is always a conscious choice. Social 
psychology research calls this traditional view into question. If 
courts, as some of them have done, began to utilize implicit bias 
literature to explain discriminatory effects, their opinions could 
potentially provide a basis for overruling the discriminatory intent 
doctrine.  
C. Implicit Bias: Critiques and Replies 
1. Critique: IAT Does not Predict Actual Behavior 
Although the implicit bias literature has greatly impacted social 
psychology and legal scholarship, critics question whether the 
research actually explains how people behave.
106
 Gregory Mitchell 
and Philip E. Tetlock wrote a scathing critique of the use of implicit 
bias studies by antidiscrimination scholars.
107
 Mitchell and Tetlock 
advance four primary critiques of the findings within implicit bias 
research. They argue that implicit bias researchers: (1) equate implicit 
stereotypes with a propensity to discriminate unconsciously;
108
 
(2) dismiss explanations for behavior that conflict with implicit bias 
 
 106. See Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey Rachlinski, & Richard Epstein, Implicit Bias and the 
2008 Presidential Election, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210, 216–20 (2008) (questioning 
the relevance of implicit bias) (remarks of Richard Epstein). 
 107. Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
67 OHIO STATE L.J. 1023 (2006). 
 108. Id. at 1030. 
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theory;
109
 (3) make flawed conclusions regarding causation, when 
findings suggest correlation at best;
110
 and (4) simply assume that 
laboratory evidence of implicit bias will inevitably lead to the same 
results in real-world situations.
111
 Together, these critiques essentially 
make a singular assertion: implicit bias theory does not explain 
actual behavior. 
2. Responses 
If accurate, these critiques would seriously weaken the usefulness 
of implicit bias theory. Several scholars, however, have rebutted 
Mitchell and Tetlock’s criticisms and similar arguments that other 
researchers have made. Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji, 
for example, conducted a meta-analysis of 122 studies of implicit 
bias.
112
 These studies involved 184 independent samples and 14,900 
subjects. Greenwald et al. found ample support for the predictive 
value of the IAT after controlling for other factors.
113
 Some of the 
studies Greenwald et al. analyzed found that the IAT predicted racial 
disparities in hiring, employment evaluations, and medical 
treatment.
114
 Similarly, Lane et al. discuss numerous studies 
regarding the accuracy of the IAT. These studies confirm that the 
IAT can predict whether whites will exhibit hostility toward or 
discomfort around blacks.
115
 Other studies have found that people 
with high race IAT scores are more likely to describe persons of color 
as hostile, relative to whites, even when persons of color engage in 
the same conduct or exhibit the same facial expressions as whites.
116
 
Greenwald and Krieger also discuss research that finds a statistically 
 
 109. Id. at 1032. 
 110. Id. at 1033. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Greenwald et al, supra note 94. 
 113. See generally id. See also Lane et al., supra note 28, at 441 (arguing that the 
Greenwald et al. study “provides the best response to th[e] predictive validity concern”). For 
more information regarding the Greenwald et al., see supra note 94. 
 114. See Lane et al., supra note 28, at 442 (discussing specific studies analyzed in the 
Greenwald et al. meta-analysis). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 436. 
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significant correlation between high ingroup preferences among 
whites and discriminatory treatment of persons of color.
117
  
Samuel Bagenstos has additionally demonstrated that many of 
Mitchell and Tetlock’s criticisms do not rest on science, but upon “a 
set of unexpressed normative disagreements with implicit bias 
scholars.”118 Bagenstos, for example, responds to Mitchell and 
Tetlock’s contention that the shooter studies cannot prove racial 
prejudice because black participants also tended to shoot unarmed 
black images.
119
 This argument fails to appreciate the reality that 
persons of racial minority groups often have outgroup preferences, 
due to the stigmatization of their group’s racial status.120 Bagenstos 
also criticizes Mitchell and Tetlock’s dismissal of implicit bias 
research because implicit attitudes do not always mirror explicit 
attitudes.
121
 This argument, however, actually supports using implicit 
bias theory in antidiscrimination law. If people who support 
egalitarian ideals can harbor implicitly racist attitudes, then arguably 
antidiscrimination law should look beyond conscious intent to 
consider the discriminatory impact of purportedly race-neutral 
decisions.
122
 
Bagenstos concludes that Mitchell and Tetlock have not identified 
serious problems with the science of implicit bias. Instead, according 
 
 117. See Greenwald & Kreiger, supra note 65, at 961–62. One study found that whites who 
have a strong ingroup preference exhibited greater discomfort when they were interviewed by 
black researchers, relative to white researchers. See id. at 961. Other studies have reached 
similar conclusions. Id. at 961–62. 
 118. Bagenstos, supra note 94, at 493. 
 119. Id. at 483 (citing Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 107, at 1068 n.146). 
 120. Id. (“As a logical matter, it is certainly possible that minority group members may be 
biased against members of their own group; it is hardly scientific to dismiss the possibility out 
of hand.”). 
 121. Bagenstos, supra note 94, at 482 (citing Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 107, at 7). 
 122. Id. (“To say that the concept of implicit bias lacks validity because implicit bias does 
not correlate empirically with explicit prejudice is therefore to assume the very conclusion that 
implicit bias scholars seek to challenge-that any “real” bias must be reflected in expressed 
attitudes (or the attitudes that would be expressed if the matter were called to one’s attention) 
(citation omitted)). Some statutory antidiscrimination provisions allow plaintiffs to prove 
discrimination using discriminatory impact, but the Supreme Court has held that equal 
protection plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent, rather than discriminatory impact alone. 
Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 967, 993–95 (2010) (discussing differing evidentiary standards applicable in statutory and 
constitutional antidiscrimination cases). 
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to Bagenstos, they simply believe that antidiscrimination law should 
only punish conscious wrongdoing or animus-based behavior.
123
 
Mitchell and Tetlock, for example, purport to advance “rational” 
reasons that might cause whites to treat blacks differently than other 
whites, including that criminality coincides with poverty and, because 
blacks are disproportionately poor, whites can rationally fear that all 
blacks are potentially harmful.
124
 Notwithstanding the questionable 
logic of this position,
125
 if antidiscrimination law sought to eradicate 
discriminatory impact rather than discriminatory animus, then the 
harms caused by such discriminatory conduct would be subject to 
redress regardless of the perpetrators’ conscious intent.126 
Neurological research has also validated implicit bias theory. 
Neural imaging studies show that when people who exhibit strong 
implicit biases view unfamiliar images of blacks, the sectors of the 
brain that implicitly control fear are activated.
127
 Researchers have 
also found that individuals can resist innate fear responses if higher-
level brain activity acknowledges and halts the implicitly biased 
reaction.
128
 Studies have shown that persons who are “highly 
motivated to control bias” can sever the correlation between implicit 
bias and discriminatory behavior.
129
 Doing so, however, requires 
 
 123. Id. at 488 (arguing that “what really drives Mitchell and Tetlock’s argument is not a 
scientific disagreement with the implicit bias researchers” but “a normative disagreement about 
the appropriate scope and target of antidiscrimination law”). 
 124. Id. at 486 (citing Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 107, at 1085, 1086). 
 125. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 411 (1991) (criticizing as unreasonable 
the assertion that people should fear all blacks because blacks commit a disproportionate 
amount of crimes). 
 126. See David Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 
1093 (criticizing animus requirement in antidiscrimination law); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed. 1988) (advocating an 
“antisubjugation principle, which aims to break down legally created or legally reenforced 
systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens”). See generally Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 107 (1976) 
(criticizing individualized antidiscrimination theory of equal protection and advocating group-
harm model that protects politically powerless groups from harmful state action regardless of 
the intentions of the defendant). 
 127. Lane et al., supra note 28, at 436. 
 128. Id. at 437.  
 129. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position” 45 
 
 
individuals to acknowledge their own implicit racial attitudes and the 
possible impact these prejudices could have on their behavior.
130
  
Although implicit bias theorists rely upon laboratory findings to 
evaluate human behavior, many social psychologists have replicated 
the basic findings of this research—that prejudice exists 
nonconsciously; nonconscious prejudice can cause discriminatory 
treatment of certain classes; and discrimination due to implicit bias 
can occur even when the discriminator subscribes to egalitarian 
principles. Presently, the weight of social science and emerging 
neurological studies supports the general findings of implicit bias 
theory. This research provides compelling evidence that racial 
discrimination remains pervasive in American society and that 
existing legal remedies that require proof of intentional 
discrimination are inadequate to address the elusiveness of present-
day racial discrimination. 
D. Limitation of Implicit Bias Theory 
Although the implicit bias literature offers a sophisticated model 
for analyzing the causes of contemporary racial inequality, this 
research does not provide a full accounting of racism in the United 
States. No single theory could address all aspects of such an 
enormous, complex, and persistent social problem as racism, but the 
limitations surrounding implicit bias are critical. Implicit bias 
theorists contend that patterns of discrimination today derive from the 
same force that caused discrimination in the past: namely, racial 
prejudice. In the past, however, racial prejudice was explicit; today, it 
is implicit.  
Racial inequality, however, does not represent the aggregate 
conduct of unconsciously discriminatory people.
131
 Historically, the 
roots of racism extended beyond mere hatred towards or prejudice 
against persons of color. Race was socially constructed in order to 
accomplish social domination.
132
 Negative and positive stereotypes of 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of 
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1808 (2002) (distinguishing individualized 
psychological theories of racism from institutional accounts). 
 132. Smedley, supra note 42, at 694 (“‘Race’ developed in the minds of some Europeans as 
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persons of color and whites, respectively, provided a cultural 
justification for the subjugation of nonwhites even as the nation 
espoused principles of liberty, equality, and justice.
133
 Despite the 
history of racial domination in the United States, implicit bias 
literature does not analyze racism as a system of subjugation. Instead, 
implicit bias theorists seek to understand and eliminate individual 
behavior caused by embedded racial stereotypes.
134
 Racism, however, 
remains a system of domination—justified and caused, in part, by 
negative racial stereotypes.
135
 
III. SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY 
A. Social Dominance: The Theory 
Other social psychology research could complement the implicit 
bias literature and offer greater insight regarding racism as a system 
of domination. In particular, social dominance theory, which 
 
a way to rationalize the conquest and brutal treatment of Native American populations, and 
especially the retention and perpetuation of slavery for imported Africans. . . . The creation of 
‘race’ and racial ideology imposed on the conquered and enslaved peoples an identity as the 
lowest status groups in society.”).  
 133. Smedley, supra note 42, at 694  
 134. See Lynch, supra note 32, at 100–01 (contrasting psychological and structural 
accounts of racism); Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 383–
84 (2007) (“Yet bias—even implicit bias—is too limited a way of capturing the complex 
mechanisms that produce racial disparity in particular areas. While recent legal commentary has 
made much use of research from cognitive psychology, cognitive bias fails to address how 
institutional arrangements and ongoing practices interact with longstanding, persistent patterns 
of racial inequality.”).  
 135. See Powell, supra note 49 at 796 (“Structural racism shifts our attention from the 
single, intra-institutional setting to inter-institutional arrangements and interactions. Efforts to 
identify causation at a particular moment of decision within a specific domain understate the 
cumulative impact of discrimination.”); Calmore, supra note 49, at 1078 (“An embedded view 
of racism adopts the modern characteristics of racism and situates racism not simply as inhering 
in individuals, but also in culture, institutions, and societal organization. This view of racism 
would claim that in the United States today, the principal flaw in analyzing racism is the failure 
to recognize or accept this dynamic, structured, systemic, and contextualized nature of 
racism.”); Henkel et al., supra note 49, 101 (“Thus, while the study of prejudice and 
discrimination focuses on the roles of individuals and interpersonal processes, racism 
encompasses institutional, social, and cultural processes that serve as an influential backdrop to 
individual-level perspectives.”). cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: 
On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES IN LIFE AND LAW 40 (1987) 
(advocating “dominance” approach to questions of sex equality);  
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examines the social dynamics of group hierarchy, could help to 
illuminate the structural nature of racism. In the groundbreaking work 
Social Dominance, psychologists Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto 
argue that “all human societies tend to be structured as group-based 
social hierarchies.”136 These societies have both dominant and 
subordinate groups. The distribution of items of social value is highly 
uneven in hierarchical societies. Dominant groups possess items of 
“positive social value,”137 such as “political authority and power, 
good and plentiful food, splendid homes, the best available health 
care, wealth, and high social status.”138 By contrast, subordinate 
groups tend to own resources with “negative social value,” including 
“low power and social status, high-risk and low-status occupations, 
relatively poor health care, poor food, modest or miserable homes, 
and severe negative sanctions (e.g., prison and death sentences).”139  
Sidanius and Pratto argue that group-based societies—particularly 
those societies that explicitly mandate legal egalitarianism—create 
“legitimizing myths,” or “attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and 
ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification” for group-
based inequality.
140
 With respect to race, these legitimizing myths can 
appear as racist or as race-neutral and still accomplish the same goal 
of social domination.
141
 Today, for example, neutral values such as 
colorblindness can impede the distribution of important social 
resources to subordinate racial groups, just as explicit racial bigotry 
historically accomplished the same goal.
142
  
 
 136. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 50, at 31. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 31–32. 
 139. Id. at 32. Sidanius and Pratto also distinguish group-based from individual-based 
social hierarchies. In a group-based hierarchy, individuals in dominant groups derive benefits 
from their membership in the dominant group; in individual-based hierarchy, benefits are 
earned by individual efforts. This distinction does not mean that dominant group members do 
not work to obtain positive value. Instead, the distinction emphasizes that individual differences 
cannot explain the disparity in positive social value held by dominant versus subordinate group 
members. Id. 
 140. Id. at 45. The concept of a legitimizing myth is similar to terms used by other social 
theorists to explain hierarchy-sustaining ideology. See id. 
 141. Id. at 171–75 (finding that opposition to affirmative action, which is perceived as 
violating principles of equity and individualism, correlates strongly with support of social 
dominance—when the beneficiaries are black). 
 142. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” 
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000) (arguing 
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Social dominance theory, like implicit bias research, could help to 
explain why racism persists in contemporary American life. For 
instance, if a significant number of whites are motivated to preserve 
their dominant racial status, they could engage in behavior or support 
policies that negatively impact persons of color and privilege 
whites.
143
 In light of legitimizing myths that justify racial inequality, 
however, socially-dominant white decision makers need not account 
for any racial dimensions of their preferences.
144
 For example, 
researchers have noted that merit-based measures that are silent with 
respect to race, but which disparately burden persons of color, can 
legitimize unequal access to higher education for people of color.
145
 
Compounding the issue, race-neutral legal principles, such as states’ 
rights have justified slavery, Jim Crow, and other forms of racial 
oppression.
146
 These principles continue to immunize inegalitarian 
state policies from judicial invalidation and remediation.
147
 
 
that contemporary colorblindness doctrine makes any usage of race suspect, thus disabling state 
efforts to ameliorate racial inequality and justifying unequal distribution of societal resources). 
 143. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 50, at 45 (“Not only is one’s desire for group-based 
social dominance related to one’s social ideologies, but both of these factors help drive group-
relevant social policies.”).  
 144. See Siegel, supra note 142, at 95 (“[T]he conventions of color blindness discourse 
make it possible for this society to characterize practices that enforce racial stratification as the 
product of ‘race-neutral’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’ principles of social distribution.”). 
 145. Siegel, supra note 142, at 92–93. 
 146. James M. McPherson, Abolitionists and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 52 J. OF AM. 
HIST. 493, 504 (1965) (discussing use of states’ rights discourse by opponents of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875); Ariela Gross, When is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in 
Contemporary Legal and Political Argument, 96 CAL. L. REV. 283, 290 (2008) (“Many 
Southerners argue that the South fought for states’ rights rather than to defend slavery. . . .”); 
Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview From One Perspective, 18 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 6, 69 (2009) (discussing states’ rights and federalism as 
justifications for opposing civil rights recognition); Douglas S. Massey, The Past & Future of 
American Civil Rights, 140 DAEDALUS 39 (2011) (“Although the war ostensibly erupted over 
the issue of “states rights,” the true cause was made explicit by the Confederate Constitution, 
which rejected the principle of “non-disclosure” and made repeated, unambiguous references to 
slavery in the text.”); id. (“Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens affirmed the 
centrality of slavery to the Southern cause in a speech he delivered in Savannah, Georgia, on 
March 21, 1861.”). 
 147. Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable 
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1326 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s 
protection of state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment context “deprives private 
parties of an adequate remedy at law for conceded violations of their rights”); Sylvia A. Law, In 
the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 367, 373–408 (2002) (discussing several contemporary federalism doctrines and 
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Furthermore, a culture of individualism (however complicated the 
notion)
148
 blunts popular support for social welfare programs that 
could alleviate the material deprivation of persons of color.
149
 
Overall, these legitimizing myths make racial domination more 
tolerable. 
B. Social Dominance Orientation 
1. Measuring Social Dominance 
Sidanius and Pratto use the term “social dominance orientation” 
(“SDO”) to indicate the extent of an individual’s commitment to 
group-based hierarchy.
150
 People with a high SDO have a strong 
“desire [for] group-based inequality and dominance.”151 The level of 
SDO varies from person to person.
152
 In order to measure SDO, 
Sidanius and Pratto developed several value scales using data drawn 
from forty-five samples of 18,741 respondents in eleven different 
countries.
153
 These value scales measure intergroup relations and 
“assess[] orientations toward group domination rather than just 
toward equality.”154 Sidanius and Pratto found that at least sixteen 
values shape SDO. The first eight values correlate positively with 
high SDO; the latter eight values reflect less support for SDO. The 
positive SDO values, written as thoughts that a high-SDO person 
might have, include:   
 
arguing that these precedents negatively impact civil rights plaintiffs and Congress’s ability to 
enact legislative remedies for race and sex discrimination).  
 148. BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994) (critiquing individualist interpretations of 
American culture and providing a more complicated view that situates the individual within a 
communal setting). 
 149. Martin Gilens, “Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 593, 597 (1996) (“Whatever other reasons whites may have for opposing welfare, their 
negative views of blacks appear to constitute an important factor in generating that 
opposition.”). 
 150. SIDANIUS AND PRATTO, supra note 50, at 61 (“SDO is defined as a very general 
individual differences orientation expressing the value that people place on nonegalitarian and 
hierarchically structured relationships among social groups.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 62.  
 154. Id. 
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1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use 
force against other groups. 
3. It’s okay if some groups have more of a chance in life than 
others. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on 
other groups. 
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer 
problems. 
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top 
and other groups are at the bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
155
 
Sidanius and Pratto then utilized their value scales to compare the 
relative strength of SDO among various social groups.  
 
 155. Id. at 67. The nondominance indicators are less relevant to this paper, but they 
include:  
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.  
13. Increased social equality. 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 
16. No one group should dominate in society.  
 See id. at 62.  
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2. Demographics and Policy Preferences of High-SDO 
Individuals  
According to the data collected by Sidanius and Pratto, a high 
SDO correlates positively with membership in a higher-status social 
group.
156
 Whites, heterosexuals, and men have higher SDOs than 
blacks, Latinos, gays and lesbians, and women.
157
 Although this data 
shows a strong correlation between group advantage and SDO, it 
does not necessarily prove causation.
158
 Sidanius and Pratto, 
however, suggest that dominant group members could have higher 
SDOs because of the high-status they derive from being members of 
a dominant group in society.
159
 Other researchers have made similar 
findings. Numerous studies, for example, find that subordinates tend 
to embrace policies that will alter the status quo while dominants 
typically oppose such measures.
160
 Researchers have linked these 
contrasting orientations with a desire to retain or to acquire social 
power.
161
 Dominants want to preserve their social power, while 
subordinates contest unequal group power as illegitimate.  
With respect to United States data, Sidanius and Pratto find that 
high-SDO individuals more strongly support “racism, sexism, 
nationalism, cultural elitism, and patriotism,”162 as well as “ethnic 
prejudice”163 and “political conservatism.”164 High-SDO people also 
 
 156. Id. at 77. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (stating that the authors “have not thoroughly researched the question of how 
people acquire different levels of SDO”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. John F. Dovidio et al., Another view of ‘‘we’’: Majority and minority group 
perspectives on a common ingroup identity, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 296, 311 (2007) 
(“Furthermore, majority group members often actively resist policies (e.g., affirmative action) 
that they perceive as promoting social change that threatens their own advantage. In contrast, 
members of minority groups display greater support for ideologies that de-legitimize hierarchy 
(e.g., endorsement of human rights, humanitarianism) and see social inequalities as more in 
need of change.”) (citations omitted). 
 161. Tamar Saguy et al., Beyond Contact: Intergroup Contact in the Context of Power 
Relations, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 432, 443 (2008) (“Disadvantaged group 
members wanted to talk about power differences more than did members of advantaged groups, 
who preferred primarily to talk about commonalities between the groups. Furthermore, the 
group-based differences in the desire to address power were generally due to the disadvantaged 
group members’ greater motivation for a change in the status quo.”). 
 162. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 50 at 84. 
 163. Id. 
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tend to endorse policies that enhance the unequal status of 
subordinate groups.
165
 By contrast, high-SDO individuals are less 
likely to support policies that ameliorate the unequal status of 
subordinates.
166
 High SDO, for example, correlates with support for 
“tougher law and order measures” and opposition to women’s rights, 
universal health care, social welfare programs, civil rights policies, 
and affirmative action.
167
 
Social dominance research suggests that implicit bias alone cannot 
adequately explain the persistence of racial inequality in a colorblind 
society. A desire for social domination among whites could also 
negatively impact the social and economic status of persons of color. 
Accordingly, legal scholars who use social psychology research to 
examine racial discrimination should move beyond implicit bias 
literature and consider social dominance scholarship as well.  
C. Limitations of Social Dominance Theory as Jurisprudence 
Social dominance theory could complement the social science 
scholarship that currently informs the work of antidiscrimination 
scholars. This research, however, would likely meet stiff resistance 
from legal scholars, lawyers, and judges.  
The law does not generally recognize implicit bias due to the 
intent rule and other doctrines that discount evidence of racially 
disparate impact.
168
 Implicit bias, however, sounds less accusatory 
 
 164. Id. at 85. 
 165. Id. at 88–89. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 90–91. Legal scholars have not offered criticism of social dominance theory 
(contrary to the research regarding implicit bias). Furthermore, Sidanius and Pratto have dealt 
systematically with all of the central critiques of their work. See, e.g., Michael T. Schmitt, et. 
al., Psychology Attitudes Toward Group-based Inequality: Social Dominance or Social 
Identity? 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 161 (2003) (critiquing social dominance theory); Jim 
Sidanius & Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Inequality: A Reply 
to Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen and Wilson & Liu, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 207 (2003) 
(responding to critiques of social dominance theory). Four other scholars have defended social 
dominance theory as well. See, e.g., Marc Stewart Wilson & James H. Liu, Social Dominance 
Theory Comes of Age, And So Must Change: A Reply to Sidanius & Pratto, and Turner & 
Reynolds, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 221 (2003) (prominent critics of social dominance 
theory defend it against a collection of popular academic critiques). 
 168. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 965–67 (advocating use of implicit bias 
research to provide evidence of discriminatory intent in antidiscrimination litigation). 
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than social dominance because it does not attribute racial 
discrimination to the invidious conduct of individual whites. If 
unconscious prejudices cause discrimination and potentially affect 
everyone, then legal scholars, lawyers, and judges might view these 
biases as a compelling social problem.
169
 Social dominance theory, 
by contrast, attributes systemic racial inequality to purposeful efforts 
by dominant classes to preserve their privileged status.
170
 Because 
most whites believe that racism no longer presents hardships for 
persons of color,
171
 they might resist claims that they possess racial 
privilege. If whites do not believe they have racial privilege, then 
they will likely contest the assertion that social dominance motivates 
their attitudes and actions regarding race.   
Social dominance theory could also face resistance among legal 
scholars, lawyers, and judges because whites tend to believe that 
group-based identities are inappropriate.
172
 Because many whites 
 
 169. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“Americans share a common 
historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role 
Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs 
that attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and opinions about 
nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all 
racists.”) (citations omitted). 
 170. See supra notes 121–40. 
 171. Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Science: Why and How Difference Makes a Difference, 21 
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 77, 80–81 (2010) (discussing prevailing view among whites that racism no 
long exists). 
 172. Whites, for example, typically oppose group-based racial identities and prefer 
colorblindness and individualism. See, e.g., Maykel Verkuyten, Ethnic Group Identification and 
Group Evaluation Among Minority and Majority Groups: Testing the Multiculturalism 
Hypothesis, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 134 (2005) (discussing results of a study 
in the Netherlands that finds greater support for multiculturalism among Turkish minority 
participants and more support for assimilation among Dutch majority participants); Christopher 
Wolsko et al., Considering the Tower of Babel: Correlates of Assimilation and Multiculturalism 
among Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups in the United States, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 277, 
301 (2006) (reporting “clear patterns of divergence between the attitudes of whites and ethnic 
minorities,” including greater support among minority groups for multiculturalism relative to 
whites and lesser support for assimilation); Aneeta Rattan & Nalini Ambady, Diversity 
Ideologies and Intergroup Relations: An Examination of Colorblindness and Multiculturalism, 
43 EURO. J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 12, 13–14 (2013) (“The extant research shows that majority group 
members tend to endorse a colorblind ideology to a greater degree than minority group 
members.“); id. at 14 (“Minority group members are less likely to endorse colorblindness than 
are majority group members. Instead, they tend to endorse multiculturalism.”); Victoria C. Plaut 
et al., “What About Me?”: Perceptions of Exclusion and Whites’ Reaction to Multiculturalism, 
101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 337, 339 (2011) (“Although there are certainly 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:23 
 
 
oppose the mere idea of group-based social identity, they could likely 
respond negatively to the assertion that whites’ group identity 
facilitates racial domination.   
In addition, dominant-group denial of racial privilege could make 
the legal community hostile to social dominance theory. Because 
whites typically do not believe that racism imposes substantial 
burdens upon persons of color,
173
 they react with great sensitivity to 
claims that whites, as a class, possess social privileges and 
advantages.
174
 Convincing whites that they are a socially dominant 
group would likely face tremendous resistance.  
 
individual exceptions and wide variation, empirically, dominant racial/ethnic group members 
such as Whites appear to show less support for multiculturalism than do minorities.”); Maykel 
Verkuyten, Social Psychology and Multiculturalism, 1 SOC. & PERSONALITY COMPASS 280, 
283 (2007) (“Empirical studies on multicultural attitudes indicate that the general support for 
multiculturalism is not very strong among majority groups in many Western countries.”); Evan 
P. Apfelbaum et al., Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness in 
Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918, 918 (2008) (“Colorblindness 
has emerged as a norm endorsed by many Whites and evident across a wide range of 
domains.”); Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linehan, Race and Sex Differences in Line Managers’ 
Reactions to Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action Interventions, 20 GROUP 
& ORG. MGMT. 409, 424 (1995) (finding that persons of color and white women were more 
supportive of “identity-conscious” hiring practices than white men and that persons of color 
were more supportive of such policies than white women); Carey S. Ryan et al., Multicultural 
and Colorblind Ideology, Stereotypes, and Ethnocentrism among Black and White Americans, 
10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 617, 623–24 (2007) (reporting results of a study 
finding that “the tendency to endorse multiculturalism more than colorblindness was greater 
among Black than White participants”; that “White participants more strongly endorsed a 
colorblind ideology than did Blacks”: and that “Black participants more strongly endorsed a 
multicultural than a colorblind ideology”). 
 173. Richard P. Eibach & Thomas Keegan, Free at Last?: Social Dominance, Loss 
Aversion, and White and Black Americans’ Differing Assessments of Racial Progress, 90 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 453 (2006) (discussing opinion polls showing dramatic 
difference between black and white opinions regarding the existence of racial discrimination);  
Elijah Anderson et al., The Legacy of Racial Caste: An Exploratory Ethnography, 642 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 37 (2012) (summarizing different views whites and blacks 
hold with respect to the contemporary significance of racism); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 919 n.4 (2009) (citing numerous studies finding 
dramatic differences among whites and persons of color regarding the ongoing significance of 
race). 
 174. Some research has found that whites exhibit greater racism when they are told that 
whites possess racial privileges. See Nyla R. Branscombe et al., Racial Attitudes in Response to 
Thoughts of White Privilege, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 212 (2007) (“Efforts to reduce 
racism often involve highlighting the existence of racial inequality. For Whites, however, 
pointing out their privileged position in the social structure represents a challenge to the status 
of the ingroup—precisely the context that our data suggest will increase racism.”). 
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Social dominance theory could also face challenges in law due to 
Supreme Court precedent. Currently, the Court generally finds that 
the Constitution does not protect group rights, particularly when 
claimants assert claims of racial injustice.
175
 The Court has also held 
that governmental allocation of resources to subordinate groups for 
remedial purposes must survive the same level of scrutiny as policies 
that explicitly seek to bolster white supremacy.
176
 Furthermore, the 
Court has not treated as unconstitutional many forms of state action 
that reinforce the subordinate status of people of color, in part, 
because it rejects group-based equality claims.
177
 Because the Court 
does not believe that the Equal Protection Clause bars facially neutral 
laws that strengthen racial inequities, it is highly unlikely that most of 
the justices would accept the contention that Court precedents 
contribute to racial inequality.  
Finally, legal actors might not accept the premises of social 
dominance theory because many of them, especially judges, have 
already responded unfavorably to preexisting scholarship that 
conceives of racism as a form of hierarchal social relationships, 
rather than individual prejudice. Critical race theorists, feminists, and 
other antidiscrimination scholars have struggled to persuade the 
Court that it should treat the Fourteenth Amendment as a legal 
prohibition of subjugation, rather than as a bar to any explicit usage 
of race or sex in public policy.
178
 Despite the pervasiveness and 
sophistication of legal scholarship on antisubordination theories of 
 
 175. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000) (“All citizens, regardless of 
race, have an interest in selecting officials who make policies on their behalf, even if those 
policies will affect some groups more than others. Under the Fifteenth Amendment voters are 
treated not as members of a distinct race but as members of the whole citizenry.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (holding that 
“judicial review must begin from the position that ‘any official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.’“ (citing Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting))); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
 177. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 495 (rejecting group-based racial remedy on the grounds that it 
harms whites). See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds other than 
Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 637–81 (discussing Supreme Court doctrines that reinforce subordination). 
 178. See Hutchinson, supra note 173, at 615.  
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equality, the Court has not abandoned its colorblind (and to some 
extent sex-blind) interpretation of the Constitution.
179
  
Application of antisubordination theory would lead to a more 
rigorous review of policies that harm subjugated groups, regardless of 
the intent of the state actor,
180
 and to a less invasive analysis of 
policies that seek to ameliorate racial inequality, even if those 
policies contain racial classifications.
181
 Social dominance theory 
addresses similar concerns as antisubordination scholarship, 
including the recognition of group hierarchy and the reproduction of 
unequal social relations through a set of culturally dominant 
legitimizing myths. Given the similarities between social dominance 
and antisubordination theories, the Court would likely reject social 
dominance theories of law.  
For all of the foregoing reasons, social dominance theory could 
face formidable resistance among legal actors. These limitations, 
however, do not discredit the usefulness of social dominance theory 
for analyzing the causes of contemporary racial inequality. 
IV. IMPLICIT BIAS, SOCIAL DOMINANCE, RACE AND CRIMINALITY 
Because the law regulates racial discrimination, implicit bias and 
social dominance theories have the potential to impact legal analysis 
in a variety of settings. Indeed, many legal scholars have already 
utilized implicit bias research to examine the inadequacies of existing 
civil rights doctrines and to push for legal reform. Social dominance 
theory, however, has not captured the attention of legal scholars; 
nonetheless, social dominance theory could also make important 
contributions to law and policy surrounding race. 
This Part examines the usefulness of implicit bias and social 
dominance theories for analyzing the prevalence of racism in 
contemporary criminal law and enforcement. Criminal law and 
enforcement are critical sites for examining racial inequality for 
several reasons. First, federal and state governments routinely 
 
 179. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 at 2418 (discussing precedent finding racial distinctions 
“suspect” and “odious”). 
 180. Hutchinson, supra note 173, at 683–84. 
 181. Id. at 684–85. 
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exercise their authority to enact criminal law and enforcement 
measures.
182
 Second, historically, criminal law and enforcement 
contributed greatly to the socially subordinate status of racial 
minorities.
183
 Finally, strong racial disparities persist within criminal 
law and enforcement.
184
 Implicit bias and social dominance research 
can explain the resilience of these disparities despite legal reforms 
that mandate formal racial equality.   
A. Implicit Bias and Criminal Law 
Relying on implicit bias theory, legal scholars have argued that 
nonconscious racial attitudes and stereotypes negatively affect 
persons of color throughout every phase of criminal law and 
enforcement, including interactions with police, the decisionmaking 
of juries, judges, and prosecutors, and the choices made by 
legislators.
185
 This research links disparate treatment of persons of 
color within criminal law and enforcement with the pervasiveness of 
implicit bias.  
1. Police 
Legal scholars and social scientists have utilized implicit bias 
research to argue that law enforcement shooting of unarmed black 
men could stem from racial prejudice, rather than actual threatening 
behavior by the victim.
186
 Other scholars contend that stop and frisk 
 
 182. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
512 (2001) (“Criminal law is both broad and deep: a great deal of conduct is criminalized, and 
of that conduct, a large proportion is criminalized many times over. I believe these propositions 
would be accepted by anyone who read an American criminal code, state or federal.”); Tom R. 
Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 86–90 
(2004) (discussing legitimacy and law enforcement). 
 183. See infra notes 237–47. 
 184. See Tonry, supra note 13, at 274; Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The 
Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 
44 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 695, 700 (2010) (“In short, ‘racism’ and ‘discrimination’ are nowhere 
in the post–civil rights era, yet punishment and surveillance are increasingly everywhere for 
blacks and Latinos.”). 
 185. See infra notes 186–260. 
 186. See Lane et al., supra note 28, at 430; Banks et al., supra note 27, at 1174; See 
generally Kahn & Davies, supra note 105 (finding that implicit stereotypes of black men as 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:23 
 
 
policies, which disparately affect men of color in many jurisdictions, 
result from implicit bias.
187
 These works have even begun to impact 
court rulings. In August 2013, for example, a United States District 
Court issued a landmark ruling when it found that the New York City 
Police Department’s stop and frisk policy discriminated against 
blacks and Latinos.
188
 The court found inexplicable racial disparities 
in the application of the policy.
189
 The court attributed these 
disparities, in part, to implicit racial stereotypes.
190
 Implicit bias 
theory provided a compelling social context for the court to find that 
the statistical data evinced racial discrimination. This type of 
analysis, if embraced by judges, could greatly influence the outcome 
of antidiscrimination lawsuits when evidence of discriminatory intent 
is an essential element of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
2. Juries 
Numerous studies analyze the possible influence of implicit racial 
stereotypes on jurors. Several laboratory tests, for example, indicate 
that mock jurors describe behavior as threatening or innocuous 
depending on the race of the potential assailant or victim.
191
 In one 
study, white participants viewed an argument between two people 
that ended with a shove.
192
 The researchers asked participants to state 
 
dangerous increases as participants in study view images of persons with more phenotypically 
black characteristics, such as dark skin and flat noses). 
 187. L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L. J. 1143, 
1155 (2012) (linking race-based stop and frisk encounters with implicit bias). 
 188. Floyd v. New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (2013). 
 189. Id. at 589. 
 190. Id. at 580–81 (“Other recent psychological research has shown that unconscious racial 
bias continues to play an objectively measurable role in many people’s decision processes. It 
would not be surprising if many police officers share the latent biases that pervade our society. 
If so, such biases could provide a further source of unreliability in officers’ rapid, intuitive 
impressions of whether an individual’s movements are furtive and indicate criminality.” (citing 
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2006))). 
 191. Lee, Race and Self Defense, supra note 125, at 405–06 (discussing study which found 
that participants were more likely to rate behavior engaged in by blacks as “violent,” but were 
less likely to do so when whites engaged in the same behavior); Id. at 406 (discussing study 
which “found that both Black and White children tended to rate relatively innocuous behavior 
by Blacks as more threatening than similar behavior by Whites”). 
 192. Id. at 405–06. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position” 59 
 
 
whether the shove was “violent” or simply “playing around.” The 
results followed a racial pattern that coincides with negative racial 
stereotypes regarding blacks:  
Duncan found that when the person shoving was a Black 
person and the person being shoved was White, 75% of the 
subjects thought the shove constituted “violent” behavior, 
while only 6% characterized the shove as “playing around.” 
When subjects observed the same events with a White person 
as the shover and a Black person as the victim, only 17% 
characterized the White person’s shove as “violent,” while 
42% described the White person's shove as “playing 
around.”193 
The study demonstrates that the participants’ “threshold for labeling 
an act as violent was significantly lower when subjects viewed a 
Black person committing the act than when subjects viewed a White 
person committing the same act.”194 If juries evaluate behavior 
following similar racial cues, then these biases could influence their 
verdicts. 
Many scholars have, in fact, concluded that persons of color are 
more vulnerable to guilty verdicts in criminal cases. One study used 
the IAT to determine whether individual determinations of guilt 
correlated with race. Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Daniele 
Young tested this hypothesis by administering the IAT to a sample of 
sixty jury-eligible undergraduate and graduate students.
195
 Levinson 
et al. tested the participants regarding their association of black with 
“Guilty/Not Guilty” and “Pleasant/Unpleasant” descriptors196 They 
also asked the participants a series of questions to measure their self-
reported feelings towards whites and blacks.
197
 Next, the participants 
read a story that described an armed robbery and were primed with 
pictures of dark or lighter-skin perpetrators.
198
 The participants also 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 406. 
 195. See Levinson et. al., Guilty By Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 31, at 201–02. 
 196. Id. at 198–205. 
 197. Id. at 202–03. 
 198. Id. at 203. 
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viewed a list of evidence from the crime.
199
 Finally, the participants 
were asked to determine whether an individual suspect was guilty or 
not guilty.
200
 The study found that many participants implicitly 
associated black with guilt and that this association made them more 
likely to believe that the black robbery suspects were guilty.
201
 
This research could give meaning to numerous empirical studies 
that find defendants of color are more vulnerable to guilty verdicts 
than white defendants.
202
 These studies could also explain why whites 
might readily accept self-defense arguments of white defendants who 
have beaten or killed persons of color.
203
 Implicit bias research could 
demonstrate that these patterns are not statistical anomalies. Instead, 
they result from discriminatory choices that occur due to the 
pervasiveness of implicit racial bias.  
3. Judges 
Although judges must decide cases impartially, some research 
indicates that implicit biases could impact their decisions. Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie 
gave one hundred and thirty-three judges several tests to measure 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 207 (finding that “Participants held implicit associations between Black and 
Guilty . . . . [T]hese implicit associations were meaningful—they predicted judgments of the 
probative value of evidence . . . [T]he Guilty/Not Guilty IAT was unrelated to and operated 
differently than a well established attitude-based IAT . . . . [I]mplicit attitudes of race and guilt 
are quite different from attitudes of race revealed by using explicit measures . . . .”). 
 202. Samuel R. Sommers & Satia A. Marotta, Racial Disparities in Legal Outcomes: On 
Policing, Charging Decisions, and Criminal Trial Proceedings, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM THE 
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 103, 107-08 (2014 (analyzing studies that find overall 
racial disparity in jury verdicts depending upon the race of the defendant, victim, and jurors); 
Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal 
Trials, 127 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1017 (2012) (finding substantially higher 
conviction rate for black defendants relative to white defendants from all-white juries and that 
the presence of just one black jury eliminates statistical gap); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, 
Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the 
“Empathic Divide,” 45 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 69, 75–79 (2011) (discussing numerous studies 
that find race determines whether juries impose death penalty). 
 203. See generally Cynthia Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception 
of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (contending that the law of self-defense 
combined with racism among jurors contributes to acquittals when whites kill people of color). 
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whether they had implicit racial attitudes.
204
 The first test was a 
standard IAT that required the participants to match positive words 
with white faces on a computer screen.
205
 Next, the participants 
matched black faces with positive words and white faces with 
negative words. The researchers found that 87.1 percent of the white 
judges had implicit preferences for whites, while black judges did not 
show a preference in either direction.
206
  
A second test required the judges to examine three hypothetical 
cases.
207
 In two of the cases, which involved juvenile offenders, the 
researchers did not disclose the racial background of the 
defendants.
208
 The judges, however, were primed regarding race 
before they examined the hypothetical cases.
209
 In the third case, 
however, some judges were told explicitly that the defendant was 
white, while other judges were told that he was black.
210
 Contrary to 
findings in other research (not specific to judges), this study found no 
significant relationship between white judges’ IAT scores and the 
assessment of guilt among the participants who were primed and 
those who were not.
211
 Judges whose IAT scores favored whites and 
who were also racially primed with black stereotypes, however, were 
more likely to assign harsher sentences than the other participants.
212
 
The third study, which used explicit racial demographics, also 
showed an insignificant relationship between implicit bias and 
judicial assessment of guilt
213
 with one notable exception: black 
judges who exhibited a strong positive attitude regarding blacks gave 
lower sentences to known black defendants.
214
  
 
 204. Rachlinski et al., supra note 30, at 1205–08. 
 205. Id. at 1209. 
 206. Id. at 1210.  
 207. Id. at 1211. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. The judges were primed regarding race with subliminally shown words associated 
with blacks. Id. at 1213 n.86 (listing the subliminally shown words associated with black 
people). 
 210. Id. at 1211. 
 211. Id. at 1216. 
 212. Id. at 1217. 
 213. Id. at 1219. 
 214. Id. at 1218. 
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These results might seem counterintuitive,
215
 but the researchers 
suspect that the finding could demonstrate that when race remains 
subtle, judges are more likely to act upon implicit racial stereotypes 
and impose harsher sentences.
216
 When judges confront race 
explicitly, however, they can adjust their decisions to reach 
egalitarian outcomes.
217
 Because this is the only published study that 
involves use of the IAT with actual judges, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from the results. Given the abundance of data regarding 
the impact of implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes upon human 
behavior, it is rational to believe that some judges make decisions 
that reflect nonconscious racial bias.
218
 
In order to combat the potential impact of implicit biases upon 
judicial decisionmaking, some organizations have provided literature 
to judges that explains implicit bias and that offers suggestions to 
avoid its effects.
219
 The extent to which these resources have led to 
policy reforms or altered the thinking of individual judges remains 
unclear. 
4. Prosecutors 
Although no published study discusses the participation of 
prosecutors in IAT research, some scholars contend that the wide 
 
 215. Id. at 1216 (stating that the result of the study “contrasts sharply” with other research 
on implicit bias and guilt assessments). 
 216. Id. at 1223 (“In effect, the subliminal processes triggered unconscious bias, and in just 
the way that might be expected.”). Moreover, the authors believed that when race was made 
explicit, white judges avoided racial bias because the tried “to compensate for unconscious 
racial biases in their decisionmaking.” Id. 
 217. Rachlinski et al., supra note 30, at 1223. 
 218. Outside of criminal law, a recent empirical study finds that white appeals judges are 
more likely to reverse black trial court judges than white trial court judges. See Maya Sen, Is 
Justice Really Blind? Race and Appellate Review in U.S. Courts (2012) (unpublished paper) (on 
file with the author’s OpenScholar@Harvard page). Other factors limit the value of this study. 
First, judges only determine guilt when the defendant waives a right to a jury trial. Also, judges 
have the ability to shape the outcome of cases in many other ways, including rulings on 
evidence, police conduct, and prosecutorial behavior. 
 219. See Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren, Fred L. Cheesman II & Jennifer K. Elek, 
Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, National Center for State 
Courts (2012), www.ncsc.org/ibreport; Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer for Courts, National 
Center for State Courts (2009), http://wp.jerrykang.net.s110363.gridserver.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/10/kang-Implicit-Bias-Primer-for-courts-09.pdf. 
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discretion that prosecutors enjoy renders the prosecutorial process 
highly susceptible to the operation of implicit racial stereotypes.
220
 
Many of the negative racial stereotypes that affect how individuals 
perceive persons of color could also influence prosecutorial 
behavior.
221
 Stereotypes of black, Arab, and Latino men as 
dangerous, for example, could affect how prosecutors assess evidence 
and, in turn, impact charging decisions, plea bargaining, and sentence 
recommendations.
222
 The Supreme Court, however, has generally 
insulated prosecutors from most questions regarding their decisions 
to prosecute—even when the exercise of that discretion leads to 
strong and arguably inexplicable patterns of racial discrimination.
223
 
Indeed, findings in some case law strongly suggest the influence of 
implicit (or explicit) racial bias on prosecutorial decisions. In 
McCleskey v. Kemp,
224
 for example, the Supreme Court held that a 
black defendant failed to establish that the state of Georgia imposed 
the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner.
225
 A statistical 
study the defendant presented, however, demonstrated a strong 
correlation between the race of defendants and victims in decisions to 
impose the death penalty. Defendants who murdered whites were 
 
 220. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 795 (2012). Such 
prosecutorial discretion encompasses the power, inter alia, to decide whether or not to file 
charges, what type of charges to file, whether to seek pretrial detention, jury selection, and the 
allocation of prosecutorial resources to prosecute crime in that jurisdiction. 
 221. Id. at 805 (“Considered together, over a decade of research on implicit racial bias 
shows that racial stereotypes can be activated easily and can lead to powerful and biased 
decision-making. In the case of prosecutorial decision making, there is significant reason to be 
concerned that implicit biases could similarly lead to discriminatory results.”). 
 222. See generally Smith & Levinson, supra note 220, at 805. 
 223. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458, 469 (1996) (Although all of the crack 
cocaine cases for the year before defendant was indicted involved black defendants, the 
Supreme Court held that defendant Armstrong was not entitled to conduct discovery regarding 
the prosecutor’s decision to charge him because he failed “to produce some evidence that 
similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not.”). In 
Armstrong, the Court also found that compliance with the discovery request would drain 
prosecutorial resources that could be utilized for other purposes. Id. at 468 (“If discovery is 
ordered, the Government must assemble from its own files documents which might corroborate 
or refute the defendant’s claim. Discovery thus imposes many of the costs present when the 
Government must respond to a prima facie case of selective prosecution. It will divert 
prosecutors’ resources and may disclose the Government’s prosecutorial strategy.”). Id.  
 224. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
 225. Id. at 292. 
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more likely to receive a death sentence. Blacks who murdered whites, 
as did the defendant, had the greatest probability of receiving the 
death penalty.
226
 These disparities likely resulted from discrimination 
among jurors.  
A decision to pursue the death penalty in a given case, however, 
usually rests within the discretion of the prosecutor.
227
 This 
discretion, as legal scholars have argued, permits racial 
discrimination to occur.
228
 In McCleskey, statistical data indicated 
that prosecutors were much more likely to pursue the death penalty 
when whites were victims and that the black defendant-white victim 
combination led to the highest rate of death penalty cases filed by 
prosecutors.
229
 Studies of capital punishment in other states and in the 
federal system have made similar findings.
230
 The Court, however, 
ruled that because prosecutorial discretion is a fundamental part of 
American criminal law and enforcement, judges could not force 
prosecutors to disclose why they chose to pursue a particular 
punishment in a given case.
231
 Although prosecutorial discretion 
cannot trump the Equal Protection Clause, the inflexible recognition 
of prosecutorial discretion (and the discriminatory intent rule) makes 
equal protection an ineffective safeguard against racially biased 
decisions by prosecutors.
232
  
 
 226. Id. at 286–87. 
 227. Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating 
Counties' Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 314 (2010) (“While state 
legislatures authorize capital punishment and draft the statutes under which it will be imposed, 
actual enforcement typically falls to county prosecutors.”). 
 228. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 220, at 805–22 (analyzing how implicit bias can 
impact prosecutorial decisions). 
 229. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287  
 230. Hemant Sharma, John M. Scheb II, David J. Houston & Kristin Wagers, Race and the 
Death Penalty: An Empirical Assessment of First Degree Murder Convictions in Tennessee 
after Gregg V. Georgia, 2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF RACE, GENDER, & SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 4–9 
(2013) (discussing numerous studies); Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. 
Young, Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study Of Implicit Racial Bias On Jury-Eligible Citizens 
In Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 526–31 (2014) (discussing contemporary 
racial disparities in capital punishment); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial 
Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 433–37 (2010) (discussing 
racial disparities in application of federal death penalty). 
 231. McCleskey, 481 U.S.  at 311–12. 
 232. Lucy Adams, Death by Discretion: Who Decides Who Lives and Dies in the United 
States of America?, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381, 394–95 (2005) (describing how the discriminatory 
intent rule and prosecutorial discretion erect almost insurmountable barriers to defendants who 
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Prosecutorial decisions impact defendants throughout the process 
of criminal adjudication, and scholars have found racial disparities in 
practices that include the severity of the criminal charge, whether to 
charge or seek an alternative to prosecution, the favorability or 
harshness of terms in a plea agreement, and the decision to seek 
statutory penalty enhancements or pursue the death penalty.
233
 
Implicit bias research could explain why these patterns exist. 
5. Legislators 
To date, no published studies have applied the IAT to state or 
federal legislators. Many criminal statutes, however, produce 
disproportionately negative outcomes for persons of color, which 
could result from implicit racial bias.
234
 The sentencing disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine, for instance, has received much 
attention from legal scholars and policy makers.
235
 Although 
Congress recently reduced, though not eliminated, the disparity, the 
differential punishment schedule for crimes involving these two 
drugs have led to stark sentencing disparities for whites and persons 
of color. Convictions for trafficking and possession of crack cocaine 
have led to lengthy sentences for black and Latino drug offenders, 
who make up a greater percentage of persons arrested for crack 
cocaine offenses; on the other hand, convictions for powder cocaine 
offenses have led to relatively shorter sentences for white drug 
 
seek to challenge a charging decision as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).   
 233. See Smith & Levinson supra note 220, at 805–22.  
 234. Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing Policies To Address Disparities, 23 
CRIM. JUST. 16, 17 (2009) (discussing racial impact of sentencing statutes and advocating 
reforms that would consider these effects before lawmakers vote to enact these policies); 
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race 
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 463 (2010) (discussing harmful racial impact of laws that 
impose numerous burdens, beyond sentencing, for people convicted of certain crimes); Traci 
Schlesinger, The Failure of Race Neutral Policies: How Mandatory Terms and Sentencing 
Enhancements Contribute to Mass Racialized Incarceration, 57 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 56, 56 
(2011) (analyzing racial effects of mandatory sentencing and sentencing enhancements). 
 235. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1283, 1287 (1995). Initially, the sentencing disparity meant that a ten-year mandatory minimum 
sentence could be imposed for possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine, instead of 5,000 grams 
for powder cocaine, and a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of 5 grams of 
crack cocaine, instead of 500 grams for powder cocaine. See id. at 1287. 
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offenders, who constitute a higher percentage of individuals arrested 
for powder cocaine offenses.
236
  
Furthermore, the targeting by cops and prosecutors of crack 
cocaine offenses and black and Latino offenders, has led to wide 
racial disparities in the general enforcement of drug laws.
237
 The 
specific focus by law enforcement officials on crack cocaine offenses 
compounds the racial effects of the sentencing disparity.
238
 The trial-
court record in United States v. Clary,
239
 which sustained an equal 
protection challenge to the crack and powder cocaine sentencing 
disparity, indicates that several members of Congress made explicit 
racially charged references during debates that led to the enactment 
of the disparate sentencing schedule.
240
 Furthermore, the federal 
crack cocaine legislation was passed during a period of intense media 
coverage that often used racially coded language.
241
 Nevertheless, 
 
 236. See id. at 1289 (discussing disparity among blacks); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug 
Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. 
PROBLEMS 419, 436 (“In particular, our findings indicate that blacks and Latinos are 
overrepresented among those arrested for drug possession compared with a variety of measures 
of drug use. This overrepresentation primarily results from law enforcement’s focus on crack 
users, and especially on black and Latino crack users.”). The Fair Sentencing Act, passed in 
2010, reduced the crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity. See Pub. L. 111-220, Aug. 3, 
2010. 
 237. See Becket et al., supra note 236, at 436. 
 238. Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine 
Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 121, 131–32 (1994) (discussing severe impact 
upon blacks and Latinos of mandatory sentences in federal drug laws). 
 239. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 240. Id. at 783–85. 
 241. The judge summarized the media reporting as follows: 
Crack cocaine eased into the mainstream of the drug culture about 1985 and immediately 
absorbed the media’s attention. Between 1985 and 1986, over 400 reports had been 
broadcast by the networks. Media accounts of crack-user horror stories appeared daily on 
every major channel and in every major newspaper. Many of the stories were racist. 
Despite the statistical data that whites were prevalent among crack users, rare was the 
interview with a young black person who had avoided drugs and the drug culture, and even 
rarer was any media association with whites and crack. Images of young black men daily 
saturated the screens of our televisions. These distorted images branded onto the public 
mind and the minds of legislators that young black men were solely responsible for the 
drug crisis in America. The media created a stereotype of a crack dealer as a young black 
male, unemployed, gang affiliated, gun toting, and a menace to society. These stereotypical 
descriptions of drug dealers may be accurate, but not all young black men are drug dealers. 
The broad brush of uninformed public opinion paints them all as the same. 
Id. at 783 (citations omitted). 
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every United States Court of Appeals that has decided equal 
protection claims related to the crack and powder cocaine sentencing 
disparity have found no constitutional violation.
242
 
As several historians have found, however, drug enforcement 
policies in the United States have often involved race-based decision-
making. The association of marijuana with Mexican Americans,
243
 
heroin and cocaine with blacks,
244
 and opiates with Chinese 
Americans
245
 inspired state and federal prohibitions of these drugs. 
Penalties for marijuana and powder cocaine, however, were reduced 
as the drugs became more popular among whites.
246
 Today, many 
 
 242. United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 658 (2013) (en banc) (observing that 
numerous federal courts of appeals have rejected equal protection challenges to crack and 
powder cocaine sentencing disparity and finding that no precedent weakens these rulings).  
 243. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of 
Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. 
REV. 971, 1011 (1970) (arguing that “racial prejudice” against Mexican Americans was “the 
most prominent” cause of state prohibitions of marijuana in the 1930s). 
 244. The Harrison Act of 1914, the first federal law to prohibit distribution of cocaine and 
heroin, was passed on the heels of overblown media accounts depicting heroin-addicted black 
prostitutes and criminals in the cities. The author of the Act, Representative Francis Harrison, 
moved to include coca leaves in the bill “since [the leaves] make Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola and 
all those things are sold to Negroes all over the South.” The bill appeared to be facing defeat 
until Dr. Hamilton Wright, the American delegate to the Hague Opium Conference, 1911–1912, 
submitted an official report in which he warned Congress of the drug crazed blacks in the South 
whose drug habits “threaten[ed] to creep into the higher social ranks of the country. . . .” 
Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 775 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 245. The District Court in Clary discussed the linkage of animus towards the Chinese and 
the criminalization of opium:  
Media accounts and inaccurate data influenced public opinion about opium smoking. 
“Ambivalence and outright hostility” toward Chinese coupled with the concern that 
opium smoking was spreading to the upper classes, provided the foundation for the 
passage of the 1909 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act. “Yellow Peril” was a term used in 
the years between the Great Wars to express the fear that the huge population of the 
Far East posed a military threat to the West. This fear induced an aversion to the 
opium usage believed to be prevalent in Chinese communities and foisted anti-opium 
legislation. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
 246. See id. (“The social history is clear that so long as cocaine powder was a popular 
amusement among young, white professionals, law enforcement policy prohibiting cocaine was 
weakly enforced.”); Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 
695 (2013) (“Young white users also enjoy their own subset of drug decriminalization: Two of 
their favorite substances, marijuana and unprescribed attention-deficit medication, are unlawful 
de jure but condoned de facto.” (citing David J. Leonard, Preventing the Rise of Pothead U., 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 2, 2013), http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/01/02/ 
preventing-theriseof-pothead-u/)); Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, 
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states are decriminalizing marijuana, reducing existing criminal 
penalties, or permitting its use for medical purposes.
247
 Also, 
Congress recently passed legislation that prohibits the use of federal 
funds to enforce federal anti-marijuana laws in states that have 
decriminalized the drug for medical or recreational purposes.
248
 
These legal changes did not occur as a result of mass mobilization by 
persons of color or antiracist social movement organizations, 
although advocates of marijuana decriminalization sometimes made 
appeals to racial justice in their arguments.
249
 Generally, the War on 
Drugs, which began in the 1980s and continues today, has led to 
disparate outcomes for persons of color in terms of arrests, 
sentencing, and incarceration.
250
  
Implicit racial bias could influence legislative choices in other 
criminal contexts. Several states and some municipalities, for 
example, have recently enacted anti-immigrant measures that 
disparately impact persons of color, particularly Latinos.
251
 In 
 
Federal, and Hemispheric Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 
6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 359, 368–69 (2013) (discussing liberalizing attitudes regarding 
marijuana when whites became prototypical users); cf. Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: 
“De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 611, 613–15 (2000) (associating historical criminalization of drugs by linking the 
substances explicitly or implicitly to persons of color). 
 247. Evan Horowitz, In 2014, Many States Experimented With Marijuana Laws, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/26/experimenting-with-
drug-laws/jT5HOAUveGaLrGW6FXFI0I/story.html  (“Across the country, states have relaxed 
their drug laws and experimented with new policies that ease penalties for marijuana use or 
make it available to medical patients.”). 
 248. Russell Berman, Why Congress Gave in to Medical Marijuana, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 
17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/a-congressional-surrender-in-the-
medical-marijuana-fight/383856/ (“The $1 trillion spending bill that passed last week included a 
provision that blocks the Justice Department from spending any money to enforce a federal ban 
on growing or selling marijuana in the 23 states that have moved to legalize it for medical 
use.”). 
 249. This does not mean, however, that racial justice advocates have not participated in 
debates regarding the decriminalization of marijuana. See Rima Vesely-Flad, New York City 
Under Siege: The Moral Politics of Policing Practices, 1993-2013, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
889, 908 (2014) (analyzing racial justice dimension of marijuana legalization debate). 
 250. See Tonry, supra note 13, at 274. 
 251. Sophia J. Wallace, Papers Please: State-LevelAnti-Immigrant Legislation in the Wake 
of Arizona’s SB 1070, 129 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUART. 261, 264 (2014) (“The introduction of 
immigration legislation and initiatives at the state level is not a new phenomenon. However, the 
frequency and intensity of anti‐immigrant legislation has increased.”); Samantha Sabo, Susan 
Shaw, Maia Ingram, Nicolette Teufel-Shone, Scott Carvajal, Jill Guernsey de Zapien, Cecilia 
Rosales, Flor Redondo, Gina Garcia, & Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith, Everyday Violence, 
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addition, Arab or Arab-appearing men have been subjected to 
aggressive racial profiling and other misconduct—the result of 
counter-terrorism practices authorized by Congress.
252
 In December 
2014, President Obama announced that he would create new 
guidelines regarding racial profiling for federal law enforcement 
officers.
253
 President Obama made this announcement after weeks of 
national racial division surrounding the decisions by two grand 
juries—one in Ferguson, Missouri and the other in Staten Island, 
New York—not to indict white police officers who killed unarmed 
black males.
254
 Early media reports, however, state that the new 
federal regulations would permit racial profiling at airports, border 
crossings and immigration checkpoints.
255
 Although current Court 
doctrine might legitimize racial profiling at the border, airports, and 
 
Structural Racism and Mistreatment at the US-Mexico Border, 109 Social Science & Medicine 
66, 67 (2014) (discussing “palpable” effect of anti-immigration laws upon Latinos from 2005-
2008); Kara Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-immigrant 
Laws, 31 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 777, 777 (2010) (arguing that “state and local anti-
immigrant laws lead to the segregation, exclusion, and degradation of Latinos from American 
society in the same way that Jim Crow laws excluded African Americans from membership in 
social, political, and economic institutions within the United States and relegated them to 
second-class citizenship”); Jamie G. Longazel, Rhetorical Barriers to Mobilizing for Immigrant 
Rights: White Innocence and Latina/o Abstraction, 39 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 580, 597 (2014) 
(finding that political rhetoric supporting local anti-immigrant ordinance “contributed to 
Latina/o subordination and the maintenance of White dominance”); Andrea Christina Nill, 
Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 35, 48–66 (2011) (arguing that political debates surrounding passage of 
Arizona anti-immigrant law led to broader public support for policies that harmed Latinos, 
including racial profiling, reapeal of birthright citizenship, and measures that threaten Latino 
voting power). 
 252.  See Michael Welch, Ironies of Social Control and the Criminalization of Immigrants, 
39 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 319, 323 (2003) (critiquing counterterrorism and 
criminalization of immigration policies after 9/11); Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink 
of Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1690–92 (2009) (discussing dehumanization of 
Guántanamo Bay detainees); Manning Marable, Racism in a Time of Terror, 4 SOULS: A 
CRITICAL J. BLACK POL., CULTURE, AND SOC’Y 1 (2010) (discussing the relationships among 
racism, US military aggression in the Middle East, and demonization of Arabs and Muslims). 
 253. Matt Apuzzo & Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. to Continue Racial, Ethnic Profiling in 
Border Policy, N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/us/politics/ 
obama-to-impose-racial-profiling-curbs-with-exceptions.html?_r=2. 
 254. Id. (“The administration is set to release the new rules in the midst of nationwide 
protests over recent decisions in New York and Ferguson, Mo., not to prosecute white police 
officers for the deaths of unarmed black men. President Obama and Attorney General Eric H. 
Holder Jr. have called for calm between law enforcement and minorities.”). 
 255. Id. (reporting that “federal agents will still be allowed to consider race and ethnicity 
when stopping people at airports, border crossings and immigration checkpoints”). 
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immigration checkpoints, enforcement of these policies leads to 
greater scrutiny and, potentially, harassment of Arabs and Latinos.
256
 
Legislatures continue to enact criminal laws that negatively 
impact persons of color, such as habitual offender statutes and 
mandatory minimum sentences.
257
 Furthermore, the failure of 
legislatures to pass laws that empower individuals to bring legal 
actions that challenge racially neutral but racially discriminatory 
criminal law and enforcement policies ensures that these disparities 
will persist.
258
  
Criminal statutes that disparately impact persons of color could 
stem from implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes. Implicit racial 
biases could also limit the capacity of lawmakers to empathize with 
persons of color.
259
 Stereotypes of persons of color as violent and 
lawbreakers could also influence legislative decision-making.
260
  
 
 256. Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 
2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV. 67, 78 (2004) (contending that following the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center “[n]oncitizen Arabs and Muslims were subjected to special scrutiny at 
airports across the country and a new phrase—“Flying While Arab”—entered the national 
vocabulary”); id. at 74–77 (discussing racial profiling of Latinos by immigration law 
enforcement and Supreme Court precedent that, to an extent, validates these practices). See also 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (“We further believe that it is 
constitutional to refer motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at the San Clemente 
[border] checkpoint on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving patrol stop. Thus, 
even if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican 
ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Charles Crawford, Gender, Race, and Habitual Offender Sentencing in 
Florida, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 263 (2000) (finding that race was a statistically significant factor in 
the imposition of enhanced penalties against black women offenders in Florida); Cyndy 
Caravelis, Cyndy Caravelis, Ted Chiricos & William Bales, Static and Dynamic Indicators of 
Minority Threat in Sentencing Outcomes: A Multi-Level Analysis, 3 QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 405 
(2011) (finding that blacks and Latinos are significantly more likely to face enhanced 
sentencing under Florida habitual offender statutes); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RES. IN CRIME & 
DELINQ. 427 (2007) (finding Pennsylvania prosecutors more likely to pursue mandatory 
minimum sentences with Latino defendants). 
 258. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 239–40 (2007) (discussing the failure of Congress to pass the “Racial 
Justice Act,” which would allow defendants in capital cases to challenge the imposition of the 
death penalty using statistical data confirming racially disparate effects). 
 259. Mona Lynch, Crack Pipes and Policing: A Case Study of Institutional Racism and 
Remedial Action in Cleveland, 33 LAW & POL’Y 179, 184 (2011) (“In short, as a result of 
organizational structures, policies, practices, and routines, empathy is rendered an inappropriate 
response to “typical,” or stereotype-consistent, criminal suspects and defendants.”). 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 173–75 (discussing people of color as dangerous 
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Future implicit bias research could help demonstrate and provide 
potential solutions for the negative racial outcomes of criminal 
statutes. Promising developments, however, have occurred in a few 
jurisdictions that have implemented reforms. Kentucky and North 
Carolina, for example, have passed “racial justice acts” that allow 
capital defendants to challenge their death sentences if they have 
evidence that the sentence resulted from racial discrimination.
261
 
Also, Minnesota has passed a law that requires legislators to issue a 
“racial impact statement” prior to the passage of any new criminal 
law, including sentencing statutes.
262
 This law would force 
lawmakers to consider and to make public any foreseeable racial 
disparities that would result from pending legislation.
263
  
Although these innovations show promise, the impact of these 
developments on racial justice remains very small. Indeed, these 
limited reforms are vulnerable to public and legislative hostility. 
North Carolina, for example, subsequently repealed its racial justice 
act after an influx of conservative lawmakers was elected to the state 
legislature.
264
 Also, despite several attempts, Congress has declined 
to pass a bill that would create a federal cause of action for 
defendants to challenge racially disparate state or federal death 
sentences.
265
 Clearly, tremendous political and cultural changes must 
take place before the United States can introduce the necessary 
reforms to redress racial disparities in criminal law and enforcement. 
 
stereotype). 
 261. Seth Kotch, Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with 
Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031 (2010); Gennaro F. Vito, 
The Racial Justice Act in Kentucky, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 273 (2010). 
 262. Catherine London, Racial Impact Statements: A Proactive Approach to Addressing 
Racial Disparities in Prison Populations, 29 LAW & INEQ. 211, 227–28 (2011) (discussing 
Minnesota racial impact law). 
 263. Id. at 227–28. 
 264. Matt Smith, “Racial Justice Act” Repealed in North Carolina, CNN (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/justice/north-carolina-death-penalty/ (“The, legislation, known 
as the Racial Justice Act, allowed condemned convicts to use statistical analysis to argue that 
race played a role in their sentencing. Republicans who took control of the Legislature in 2010 
weakened the law last year, overriding a veto by then-Gov. Bev Perdue, a Democrat. Gov. Pat 
McCrory, a Republican elected in 2012, followed legislative action and signed its complete 
repeal Wednesday.”). 
 265. Olatunde, supra note 258, at 238–40. 
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Implicit bias theory could potentially increase support for the 
enactment of such reforms.   
B. Social Dominance and Criminal Law and Enforcement 
Although social dominance theory has not greatly impacted legal 
scholarship, it overlaps, to some extent, with preexisting works of 
critical theorists. Critical race theorists and feminist theorists, for 
example, have analyzed racial and gender inequality in structural 
terms, rather than treating unequal outcomes solely as the product of 
atomized and individual behavior.
266
 Also, several social 
psychologists have specifically examined the relationship between 
social dominance, race, and criminal law and enforcement. Their 
research could bring new insights into legal scholarship and policy.  
1. Race and Crime: A History of Domination 
Race was constructed to facilitate group domination.
267
 In 
addition, the law played a central role in the subjugation of persons of 
color.
268
 For example, the original Constitution represents a 
compromise over the issue of African enslavement.
269
 The 
Constitution did not prohibit slavery, and it barred Congress from 
banning the international slave trade until 1808.
270
 Furthermore, the 
Constitution gave slave states disproportionate representation in 
Congress because they could count three-fifths of the slave 
population as residents for purposes of allocating membership in the 
 
 266. See MACKINNON, supra note 135, at 40; Powell, supra note 49, at 796; Calmore, 
supra note 49, at 1079.  
 267. See Smedley supra note  42, at 694. 
 268. See Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1772 (2001) (observing that social theories of race have “illuminated 
the role of law and state power in fixing racial hierarchy and institutionalizing racial 
subordination”). 
 269. Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong 
Document?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1987) (“Moral principles against slavery, for those 
who had them, were compromised, with no explanation of the conflicting principles for which 
the American Revolutionary War had ostensibly been fought: the self-evident truths ‘that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’”). 
 270. Id. 
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House of Representatives.
271
 The disproportionate political power 
among the slaveholding states helped sustain the legality of 
slavery.
272
  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford273 
documents the historical usage of state and federal law to subjugate 
blacks. In this case, Dred Scott, a slave, contended that when he lived 
with his owner in Illinois, designated by federal law as a free 
territory, he was emancipated.
274
 The Supreme Court, however, held 
that enslaved blacks were not entitled to assert claims of any kind in 
federal courts.
275
 The Court, nonetheless, reached the merits of the 
case and held that Congress lacked the authority to prohibit slavery in 
the United States; doing so constituted a deprivation of private 
property rights.
276
  
The Court discussed numerous statutes in slave-holding and 
abolitionist states (in addition to attitudes towards blacks in England 
and other European nations) that discriminated against blacks.
277
 The 
Court held that these laws demonstrated that blacks were not citizens 
of the United States.
278
 The existence of these racist laws also refuted 
Scott’s contention that blacks could pursue judicial remedies in 
federal or state courts.
279
 The Court held that these laws evince the 
complete domination of all of blacks by whites in the United States, 
which justifies denying blacks access to redress in federal courts:   
The legislation of the States therefore shows in a manner not to 
be mistaken the inferior and subject condition of that race at 
the time the Constitution was adopted and long afterwards, 
throughout the thirteen States by which that instrument was 
framed, and it is hardly consistent with the respect due to these 
States to suppose that they regarded at that time as fellow 
 
 271. Id. at 1338. 
 272. John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
375, 376 (2001) (repeal of the Three-Fifths Clause by the Fourteenth Amendment was intended 
to eliminate the South’s slave power). 
 273. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 274. Id. at 452–53. 
 275. Id. at 426–27.  
 276. Id. at 452. 
 277. Id. at 405–17. 
 278. Id. at 426–27. 
 279. Id. 
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citizens and members of the sovereignty, a class of beings 
whom they had thus stigmatized, whom, as we are bound out 
of respect to the State sovereignties to assume they had 
deemed it just and necessary thus to stigmatize, and upon 
whom they had impressed such deep and enduring marks of 
inferiority and degradation, or, that, when they met in 
convention to form the Constitution, they looked upon them as 
a portion of their constituents or designed to include them in 
the provisions so carefully inserted for the security and 
protection of the liberties and rights of their citizens.
280
 
The Dred Scott decision justifies the social, political, and economic 
domination of blacks.  
State courts reached similar conclusions. In Luke v. Florida,
281
 the 
Florida Supreme Court considered whether Luke, a slave, could face 
charges of criminal mischief for killing the wandering mules of a 
neighboring plantation owner at the request of his master.
282
 The 
animals roamed freely and grazed in a garden and other land owned 
by Luke’s master.283 The court held that because Luke was merely the 
property of his owner, he could not face criminal liability. In the 
absence of legislation to the contrary, slaves lacked free will to 
commit crimes.
284
 The court also found that maintaining legal 
distinctions between blacks (enslaved or not) was necessary to 
preserve whites’ racial domination:  
The perpetuation of [slavery], indeed the common safety of the 
citizens during its continuance, would seem to require that the 
superiority of the white or Caucassian [sic] race over the 
African negro, should be ever demonstrated and preserved so 
far as the dictates of humanity will allow—the degraded caste 
should be continually reminded of their inferior position, to 
keep them in a proper degree of subjection to the authority of 
the free white citizens. And thus there is an obvious propriety 
 
 280. Id. at 416. 
 281. 5 Fla. 185 (1853). 
 282. Id. at 190. 
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. at 195–96. 
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in visiting their offences with more degrading punishment than 
is inflicted on the white citizens, while the humanity of the law 
is demonstrated by securing to them the same forms of law in 
making defence—a trial by jury—compulsory process for their 
witnesses—the aid of counsel—and indeed, as full, fair, and 
impartial a trial, as can or may be claimed by a white person.
285
 
This opinion demonstrates that, historically, states utilized criminal 
law and enforcement to establish white supremacy. And contrary to 
the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court, the “dictates of 
humanity” did not legally bind whites, as the Supreme Court made 
emphatically clear in Dred Scott.
286
 
Following the emancipation of slaves, southern states enacted 
anti-black criminal laws designed to preserve white supremacy. The 
Black Codes imposed discriminatory criminal punishments upon 
blacks and typically required them to serve periods of hard labor for 
criminal activity, including petty crimes, failure to pay debts or 
perform contracts, and simply for lacking employment.
287
 The Black 
Codes permitted states to extract unpaid labor from black children 
who were orphaned, born out-of-wedlock, and who lived in a female-
headed household. The laws also permitted the use of coerced and 
unpaid labor from children whose parents were incarcerated or 
unemployed.
288
 The Black Codes labor provisions typically gave 
preference to the individual’s former slave owner.289 Thus, many 
freed blacks and their children were compelled to work without pay 
 
 285. Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
 286. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (holding that blacks had “no rights which the white man 
was bound to respect”). 
 287. See Adamson, supra note 9, at 559 (“Blacks without visible means of support were 
obliged by law to hire themselves out during the first 10 days of January. Those without labor 
contracts or who broke their contracts were prosecuted as vagrants and sentenced to hard labor 
on local plantations.”); Adamson, supra note 9, at 560 (discussing hard labor for petty 
offenses). 
 288. See, e.g., Karin Zipf, Reconstructing “Free Woman”: African-American Women, 
Apprenticeship, and Custody Rights during Reconstruction, 12 JWH 8 (2000) (discussing 
apprenticeship laws in North Carolina). 
 289. Id. at 9 (observing that North Carolina Black Code “instructed courts not only to 
apprentice former slave children, but also to give priority to their former masters in contracting 
the apprenticeship”). 
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for their previous owners.
290
 Many other blacks became trapped in 
sharecropping agreements that required them to perform unpaid labor 
if they breached the terms of the contract, including by failing to pay 
the landowner.
291
  
The Black Codes gave white plantation owners access to cheap 
labor following the formal emancipation of slaves.
292
 These laws 
were also implemented to ensure that blacks remained completely 
subordinate to whites.
293
 
To the extent that the Union victory in the Civil War suggested 
that blacks had attained the same rights and status as whites, the 
Black Codes clearly disabused this notion. As soon as the nation 
adopted formal emancipation, states enacted criminal statutes 
designed to undo the legal recognition of blacks’ humanity. The 
legacy of the Black Codes demonstrates that formal rights contained 
in legal provisions do not determine whether equal justice exists in a 
society. The actual experiences of individuals and groups in a society 
offer more meaningful evidence of equality. Today, despite the 
formal recognition of equal protection, the law, including criminal 
law and enforcement, continues to operate in a manner that preserves 
whites’ social dominance.294  
Although most legal scholarship on race relations during the 
nineteenth century examines the unequal treatment of blacks, other 
racial groups experienced subjugation as well. Between the 
Revolutionary War and the mid-1830s, Native Americans were 
 
 290. Id. at 11–25 (discussing legal struggle by former slaves to free their children from 
apprenticeships with their former owners). 
 291. See Adamson, supra note 9, at 559 (observing that southern sharecropping became a 
system of “debt peonage”). 
 292. Adamson, supra note 9, at 560 (“Ultimately, the economic mechanisms used to 
extract a surplus from the landless blacks were buttressed by the criminal justice system. Before 
resorting to vigilante action, ex-planters and local officials used the penal system to control 
unruly blacks who withheld their labor.”). 
 293. Adamson, supra note 9, at 556 (“Hiring out convicts to planters, mining companies, 
and railroad contractors on a long-term basis was not designed solely to rid the state of a prison 
problem. In a real sense, the convict lease system was a functional replacement for slavery; it 
provided an economic source of cheap labor and a political means to re-establish white 
supremacy in the South.”). 
 294. See infra text accompanying notes 317–58.  
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violently ejected from their lands in eastern and southern states.
295
 In 
what is now considered one of the most tragic cases of injustice and 
violence against Native Americans, Georgia passed a statute in 1828 
that purported to annex all Cherokee land in the state.
296
 The law also 
forbade the Cherokee from testifying against whites in legal 
proceedings and purported to nullify all Cherokee laws.
297
 This law 
effectively immunized whites who committed crimes against the 
Cherokee from prosecution in state courts. Even if Georgia officials 
wanted to prosecute whites who committed crimes against the 
Cherokee, the inability of members of the tribe to testify against 
whites would have made it virtually impossible to convict any white 
defendant. Consequently, white violence and property crimes against 
the Cherokee were effectively decriminalized. 
After the passage of the statute, some Cherokee decided to leave 
Georgia voluntarily, but others claimed entitlement to their land 
pursuant to treaties entered by the United States and the Cherokee 
Nation that established the Cherokees’ rights as a sovereign.298 In 
1832, the Supreme Court held that the Cherokee Nation constituted a 
sovereign nation. The Court also held that Georgia could not annex 
Cherokee land because this action violated rights of the Cherokee 
created by federal statutes and treaties. The Court further held that 
Georgia acted inappropriately because the state purported to regulate 
relations with Native American tribes—which is a power the 
Constitution delegates to Congress exclusively.
299
  
 
 295. Russell Thornton, Cherokee Population Losses during the Trail of Tears: A New 
Perspective and a New Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 289, 289–90 (1984) (“During this period, 
the Cherokees were increasingly subjected to invasions of armed men from Georgia, ‘forcibly 
seizing horses and cattle, taking possession of houses from which they had ejected occupants, 
and assaulting the owners who dared make resistance’; they were all but helpless to retaliate.” 
(quoting JAMES MOONEY, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CHEROKEE 112 (1975)). 
 296. Thornton, supra note 295, at 290. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Although several suits on this issue were filed, the most famous was Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (finding that Georgia law that claimed Cherokee homeland 
violated a treaty between the United States and the Cherokee nation).  
 299. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561–62 (“They interfere forcibly with the relations 
established between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the regulation of which, 
according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the 
government of the union. They are in direct hostility with treaties, repeated in a succession of 
years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia, 
guaranty to them all the land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United 
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The recognition of the Cherokees’ rights in a judicial opinion, 
however, meant very little in the absence of a commitment by legal 
authorities to enforce the ruling. President Andrew Jackson did not 
enforce the Court’s order, and some historians contend that he even 
mocked the opinion by callously stating that “John Marshall has 
made his decision, now let him enforce it.”300 The federal government 
also bargained with several men who were not the “principal” leaders 
of the Cherokee Nation.
301
 In 1835, the United States entered into a 
new agreement with these members of the Cherokee Nation—the 
Treaty of New Echota—purportedly on behalf of all Cherokee.302 
This treaty required the Cherokee to give all of their land east of the 
Mississippi River to the United States in exchange for fifteen million 
dollars.
303
 Cherokee leadership protested the treaty, but, facing 
deliberate indifference by the United States, white supremacy in 
Georgia and the federal government, and the splintering of and 
weariness among members of the tribe, the Cherokee leaders 
ultimately acquiesced.
304
 Most of the Cherokee remained in their 
territory for three years following the consummation of the treaty.
305
 
In 1838, however, the United States military launched a campaign of 
violent ejectment that led to the Trail of Tears.
306
 It was now illegal 
for the Cherokee to remain in their homeland.
307
  
The Trail of Tears demonstrates that racism does not consist 
merely of discrete acts of discrimination against particular 
individuals. Instead, racism represents the social domination of 
persons of color by whites. One United States soldier who took part 
in the removal of the Cherokee Nation memorialized some of the 
events he witnessed. His observations illuminate the operation of 
racism as a system of group domination:  
 
States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of 
the nation to govern itself.”). 
 300. See Thornton, supra note 295, at 290 (citing MOONEY, supra note 295, at 114). 
 301. Thornton, supra note 295, at 290.  
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
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 Men working in the fields were arrested and driven to the 
stockades. Women were dragged from their homes by soldiers 
whose language they could not understand. Children were 
often separated from their parents and driven into the 
stockades with the sky for a blanket and the earth for a pillow. 
And often the old and infirm were prodded with bayonets to 
hasten them to the stockades. 
 In one home death had come during the night, a little sad 
faced child had died and was lying on a bear skin couch and 
some women were preparing the little body for burial. All were 
arrested and driven out leaving the child in the cabin. I don't 
know who buried the body. 
 In another home was a frail Mother, apparently a widow 
and three small children, one just a baby. When told that she 
must go the Mother gathered the children at her feet, prayed an 
humble prayer in her native tongue, patted the old family dog 
on the head, told the faithful creature good-bye, with a baby 
strapped on her back and leading a child with each hand started 
on her exile. But the task was too great for that frail Mother. A 
stroke of heart failure relieved her sufferings. She sunk and 
died with her baby on her back, and her other two children 
clinging to her hands.
308
 
The soldier’s narrative vividly demonstrates why legal scholars 
should resist efforts to analyze racism exclusively as acts of 
individual prejudice. The federal government, Georgia legislature and 
courts, and residents of Georgia subordinated all Cherokees. The 
parties involved in the subordination of the Cherokee were powerful 
institutions. Collectively, their disregard of the rights and liberties of 
the Cherokee reduced the tribe to second-class citizens and reinforced 
the supremacy of whites.  
In response to pleas from Cherokee leaders, the United States 
delayed the initial removal process until the summer.
309
 Due to the 
 
 308. Id. at 290–91 (quoting John G. Burnett, The Cherokee Removal Through the Eyes of a 
Private Soldier, 3 J. OF CHEROKEE STUD. 180, 183 (1978)). 
 309. Id. at 291. 
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extreme heat, the Cherokee suffered greatly.
310
 Later that year, the 
Cherokee finally departed from their lands and commenced the long 
and treacherous journey to land west of the Mississippi River (what is 
now Oklahoma).
311
 The journey proved very costly. Nearly one-
fourth of the sixteen thousand individuals who left Georgia died 
along the way.
312
 As the United States expanded westward, Native 
Americans and Mexicans would experience additional atrocities 
legitimized by the law.
313
 
The illegal—but legally sanctioned—displacement of Native 
Americans from their lands illustrates that the failure to enforce 
criminal laws and other protective measures can facilitate racial 
subjugation. Neither federal nor local authorities protected Native 
Americans from systematic racial violence and property crimes. The 
treatment of Native Americans and blacks in southern states 
demonstrates that legal actors can accomplish subordination through 
affirmative conduct as well as omission.
314
 Unpunished acts of racial 
violence reminded persons of color that whites had dominion over 
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id.; see also Leslie Hewes, The Oklahoma Ozarks as the Land of the Cherokees, 32 
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 269, 270 (1942) (discussing the removal of Cherokee from southeastern 
United States to Oklahoma). 
 312. Thornton, supra note 295, at 292–93. 
 313. See CARRIGAN & WEBB, supra note 44, at 84–88, 99–102, 131–34; Charles Geisler, 
Disowned by the Ownership Society: How Native Americans Lost Their Land, 79 RURAL SOC. 
56, 61 (2014) (“Manifest Destiny, as a lived experience, annihilated Indian people and culture. 
Somewhere between 2 and 20 million aboriginals in North America in the sixteenth century 
were reduced to 530,000 individuals by 1900 giving heft to the Euro-American claim that 
Native homelands were vacant and awaiting homesteader ‘improvement.’” (citing Douglas H. 
Ubelaker, North American Indian Population Size, A.D. 1500 to 1985, 77 AM. J. OF PHYSICAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 289–94 (1988))). 
 314. Susan Olzak & Suzanne Shanahan, Racial Policy and Racial Conflict in the Urban 
United States, 1869-1924, 82 SOCIAL FORCES 482, 506 (2003) (contending that if legal policies 
do not threaten white social dominance then these laws can operate as “legitimation processes 
that encourage violence against groups stigmatized by reinforcement of the dominant white 
boundary”); Allen D. Grimshaw, Interpreting Collective Violence: An Argument for the 
Importance of Social Structure, 391 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 9, 10 (1970 
(contending that government can take an active role in committing violence against 
subordinates or a passive role that legitimizes this violence or that reflects a neutral position). 
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their very lives.
315
 Accordingly, the law served as an important 
instrument of white supremacy.
316
  
Criminal law and enforcement facilitated racial subordination 
historically in several other ways. Many scholars, for example, 
contend that the racial application of capital punishment replaced 
lynching in southern states after lynch mobs became intolerable to the 
rest of the nation.
317
 These historical practices demonstrate the 
relationship between criminal law and enforcement and white 
supremacy. 
2. Racial Subjugation and Criminality Today 
Historically, criminal law and enforcement structured racial 
hierarchy. Negative racial stereotypes of persons of color justified the 
perpetuation of group domination. Implicit bias theorists contend that 
these racial stereotypes continue to influence practices within 
criminal law and enforcement. Social dominance theorists argue that 
the desire for group domination—which gave rise to these negative 
racial constructs—remains a substantial factor in American society. 
The relationship between social dominance orientation (“SDO”) 
and support for harsh criminal sanctions could demonstrate that 
 
 315. See James W. Clarke, Without Fear or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the 
Subculture of Violence in the American South, 28 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCI. 269, 277 (1998) 
(“Lynching became a public spectacle, symbolizing the enforcement component of white 
supremacy and the Southern wing of the Democratic party. Since lynching enhanced the 
objectives of social control, and was not a punishable crime in the South, it flourished virtually 
unchecked by the law or community pressure” (citation omitted)). 
 316. William D. Carrigan & Clive Webb, The Lynching of Persons of Mexican Origin or 
Descent in the United States, 1848 to 1928, 31 J. OF SOC. HIST. 411, 416 (2003) (analyzing the 
lynching of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the Southwest and finding that “the legal 
system not only failed to protect Mexicans but served as an instrument of their oppression”); 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. 
L. REV. 15, 24 (2002) (describing death penalty as successor to lynching in the South); Patrick 
Fisher & Travis Pratt, Political Culture and the Death Penalty, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV., 48, 
52 (2006) (Lynchings began to decline after the turn of the [twentieth] century as court-ordered 
execution supplanted lynching in the South. The increase of executions in the South can thus be 
considered to be the result of a movement away from ad hoc mob lynchings to so-called legal 
lynchings.”). 
 317. See Clarke, supra note 315, at 285 (“Lynchings peaked in the 1890s with over 1,100 
victims in that decade. Then, although numbers continued to be remarkably high, lynchings 
declined steadily in each subsequent decade. At the same time, capital punishment began a 
steep ascent as state executioners replaced lynch mobs.”);  
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contemporary criminal law and enforcement operate to sustain racial 
hierarchy. Social dominance theorists find that persons with high 
SDO tend to support tough criminal law and enforcement policies.
318
 
A desire for social dominance among whites could explain why 
criminal law and enforcement imposes systemic harms upon people 
of color. 
For several other compelling reasons, criminal law and 
enforcement offer opportunities for social dominance analysis. 
Persons of color, particularly blacks and Latinos, suffer 
disproportionately high rates of incarceration.
319
 They are more 
frequently the targets of drug law enforcement than whites.
320
 In 
many jurisdictions they receive longer sentences
321
 and 
discriminatory treatment from prosecutors who offer less favorable 
terms during plea-bargaining and disproportionately seek sentencing 
enhancements.
322
 Black and Latino offenders are also less likely to 
receive alternatives to incarceration, such as probation or diversion 
programs.
323
 Moreover, some studies show that jurors are more likely 
to presume the guilt of persons of color than whites.
324
  
Other research finds that white probation and police officers are 
more likely to conclude that juvenile offenders of color have a higher 
probability for recidivism than similarly situated whites, and they rate 
the crimes of juveniles of color more harshly than similar behavior of 
 
 318. Jim Sidanius, Michael Mitchell, Hillary Haley & Carlos David Navarrete, Support for 
Harsh Criminal Sanctions and Criminal Justice Beliefs: A Social Dominance Perspective, 19 
SOC. JUST. RES. 433, 445 (2006) (“In other words, the empirical data are consistent with the 
notion that support for severe criminal sanctions is, at least in part, motivated by the desire to 
establish and maintain group-based social hierarchy, and is additionally rationalized or justified 
in terms of moral norms (e.g., retribution). . . and/or causal beliefs (i.e., belief in deterrence).”). 
 319. Tonry, supra note 13, at 274. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 283–85. 
 322. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 220, at 805–22 (discussing disparate racial impact 
of prosecutorial decisions). 
 323. See, e.g., William D. Bales & Alex R. Piquero, Racial/Ethnic Differentials in 
Sentencing to Incarceration, 29 JUST. Q. 742 (2012) (finding that blacks and Latinos have a 
greater risk of sentencing to incarceration than whites and that blacks have the greatest risk); 
Lisa Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Outcomes Among 
Men Charged With Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 210 (2013) 
(analyzing state court data and finding that black and Latino male defendants are less likely to 
receive pretrial diversion compared to similarly situated white defendants). 
 324. See generally sources cited supra note 29. 
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whites.
325
 These factors can determine whether or not an individual 
receives incarceration or a term of probation. 
Also, many criminal statutes disproportionately impact persons of 
color, including mandatory-minimum
326
 and habitual sentencing 
laws,
327
 drug laws,
328
 and laws that impose collateral consequences 
upon ex-offenders.
329
  
Criminality locks poor persons in economic and social isolation 
because a criminal record—even without a conviction—can greatly 
diminish individual opportunity for economic and educational 
advancement.
330
  
The negative consequences of a criminal history compound the 
exposure of poor persons of color to racial and class vulnerability.
331
 
The negative experiences of persons of color within criminal law and 
enforcement worsen their inferior social status.
332
 Thus, racial 
discrimination within criminal law and enforcement is fundamentally 
 
 325. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About 
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004). 
 326. Ulmer et al., supra note 257 (finding prosecutors more likely to pursue mandatory 
minimum sentences with Latino defendants). 
 327. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 257; (finding that race was a statistically significant 
factor in the imposition of enhanced penalties against black women offenders in Florida); 
Caravelis, Chiricos & Bales, supra note 257 and the text accompanying note 257 (finding that 
blacks and Latinos are significantly more likely to face enhanced sentencing under habitual 
offender statutes). 
 328. See generally Tonry, supra note 13, at 274 (attributing mass incarceration of blacks 
and Latinos to War on Drugs). 
 329. See generally Pinard, supra note 234. 
 330. See Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratification, 36 ANNU. 
REV. SOC. 387 (2010) (discussing the role of incarceration in the enhancement of social and 
economic inequality); David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral 
Educational Damage in the Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 36 (2013) 
(finding that juvenile arrests impairs educational attainment of the defendants); Bruce Western 
& Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8 (2010) (“Mass 
incarceration thus deepens disadvantage and forecloses mobility for the most marginal in 
society. Finally, carceral inequalities are intergenerational, affecting not just those who go to 
prison and jail but their families and children, too.”). Many of these negative effects burden 
people of color more significantly due to the disproportionate number of persons of color who 
are incarcerated and the difficulty they experience overcoming these burdens. 
 331. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 196 (2012) (“Mass incarceration thus perpetuates and deepens pre-existing 
patterns of racial segregation and isolation, not just by removing people of color from society 
and putting them in prisons, but by dumping them back into ghettos upon their release.”). 
 332. Id. at 190–200 (discussing parallels between contemporary criminal law and 
enforcement and Jim Crow).  
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a process of group domination. It solidifies group-based inequality 
and preserves whites’ superior access to important social resources, 
such as jobs and education. While legal scholars have analyzed the 
impact of implicit biases upon persons of color within criminal law 
and enforcement, their research does not provide a comprehensive 
examination of the social dynamics of racism.
333
 The individuated 
focus of implicit bias theory limits its usefulness for analyzing 
contemporary racism in the United States. 
3. Social Dominance Theory and Crime 
Social dominance theorists argue that the connections between 
racial subordination and criminal law and enforcement do not occur 
coincidentally. In Social Dominance, for example, Sidanius and 
Pratto contend that criminal law and enforcement inherently 
“function[] to protect and maintain the status, privilege, and power of 
dominants.”334 Due to economic deprivation, however, persons of 
color commit a disproportionate number of crimes. Thus, criminality 
among racial subordinates is “dynamically interconnected” with 
group domination.
335
 Because criminal law and enforcement 
represent the most coercive relationship between a government and 
its citizens, dominant groups can use these legal measures to ensure 
that subordinates remain in an inferior social position.
336
  
Social dominance researchers have also found that people with 
high SDO tend to support very harsh criminal sanctions, such as 
habitual offender enhancements, the death penalty, and torture.
337
 
Numerous studies document the racial disparities associated with 
 
 333. Michelle Alexander stands out as a strong exception to the tendency of legal scholars 
to discuss contemporary racism in terms of individual bias. Her work focuses on the structural 
dimensions of criminal law and enforcement and views contemporary practices as a 
continuation and reinforcement of white supremacy. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 
331. Alexander, however, does ground her work in a particularly sociological theory, which 
distinguishes her work from this Article.  
 334. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 50, at 205. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 205–06. 
 337. Jim Sidanius, Michael Mitchell, Hillary Haley & Carlos David Navarrete, Support for 
Harsh Criminal Sanctions and Criminal Justice Beliefs: A Social Dominance Perspective, 19 
SOC. JUST. RES. 433, 445–46 (2006). 
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these punishments.
338
 Social dominance theory could explain why 
criminal law and enforcement operate to the detriment of persons of 
color. One particular study, for example, measured the attitudes of 
Swiss nationals regarding Arab immigrants.
339
 The researchers found 
that high-SDO Swiss individuals, relative to egalitarians, judged Arab 
immigrant criminals more harshly than Swiss criminals.
340
 High-SDO 
Swiss were also more likely than egalitarians to respond negatively to 
all Arab immigrants after reading a news report regarding the 
criminal conduct of a single Arab individual.
341
 When high SDO 
Swiss read reports regarding Swiss offenders, however, they did not 
form negative opinions regarding all Swiss persons.
342
 This research 
suggests that SDO among whites could contribute to the harsher 
treatment, relative to whites, of offenders and suspects of color by 
law enforcement, prosecutors, juries, and judges. The results of these 
studies suggest that racial discrimination within criminal law and 
enforcement does not occur simply because prejudiced individuals 
lack awareness of their biased motivation. Instead, a desire for group 
domination could also explain why gross racial inequality persists 
within criminal law and enforcement.  
4. Social Dominance Theory, Dehumanization, and Criminal Law 
and Enforcement 
Social dominance theory is closely tied to social psychology 
literature regarding dehumanization. Social psychologists describe 
dehumanization as the “denial of full humanness to others.”343  
According to some researchers, dehumanization has deeper 
implications for outgroup mistreatment than prejudice alone.  
 
 338. See, Smith & Levinson, supra note 220. See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987) (declining to invalidate the death sentence for a black male inmate despite study 
documenting racism in the administration of George death penalty statute). 
 339. Eva G.T. Green, Lotte Thomsen, Jim Sidanius, Christian Staerkle & Polina Potanina, 
Reactions to Crime as a Hierarchy Regulating Strategy: The Moderating Role of Social 
Dominance Orientation, 22 SOC. JUST. RES. 416 (2009). 
 340. Id. at 430. 
 341. Id. 
 342.  Id. 
 343. Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison, Lewis Di Leone, 
Carmen Marie Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of 
Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 526, 527 (2014). 
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Dehumanization could more strongly correlate with social dominance 
than prejudice because dehumanization “is a necessary precondition 
for culturally and/or state-sanctioned violence”344 and because 
“dehumanizing groups morally excludes them, making it permissible 
to treat people in a way that would be morally objectionable.”345 
According to this research, dehumanization is a central component of 
social domination.
346
  
Dehumanization fosters racial subordination by legitimizing harsh 
punitive measures for racial subordinates who engage in 
criminality.
347
 Dehumanization also blunts the empathy whites might 
have for racial minorities, which could explain why violent crimes 
against white victims typically trigger harsher punishments than 
crimes against persons of color, particularly when the offender is a 
person of color and the victim is white.
348
 Dehumanization of blacks 
could also explain why many states continue to apply the death 
penalty, which almost always operates in a racially discriminatory 
manner.
349
 
 
 344. Id. at 527. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id.; see also Gordon Hodson & Kimberly Costello, Interpersonal Disgust, Ideological 
Orientations, and Dehumanization as Predictors of Intergoup Control, 18 PSYCH. SCI. 691, 696 
(2009) (linking dehumanization and SDO). 
 347. Marc Maurer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, 3 
PUNISHMENT & SOC. 9, 17–17 (2001) (discussing dehumanization and harsh sentencing and 
suggesting connection to racism); Andrew Taslitz, Racial Threat Versus Racial Empathy in 
Sentencing—Capital and Otherwise, AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 6 (2013) (“But stereotypes of black 
defendants cast them as violent, unfeeling characters, redolent of the sub-human. Blackness 
alone does not necessarily trigger a sense of black dangerousness; rather, empathy for white 
victims, but not for black offenders, triggers heuristics portraying blacks as unworthy and 
threatening.”). 
 348. Taslitz, supra note 347, at 6 (discussing disparate empathy for white victims and black 
offenders). 
 349. Craig Haney, Condemning The Other In Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, 
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1576–82 (2004) 
(advocating that lawyers humanize black capital defendants to overcome negative racial 
stereotypes). For literature regarding the racial implications of the death penalty, see Hemant 
Sharma, John M. Scheb II, David J. Houston & Kristin Wagers, Race and the Death Penalty: 
An Empirical Assessment of First Degree Murder Convictions in Tennessee after Gregg V. 
Georgia, 2 TENN. J. OF RACE, GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 1, 4–9 (2013) (discussing numerous 
studies); Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An 
Empirical Study Of Implicit Racial Bias On Jury-Eligible Citizens In Six Death Penalty States, 
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 526–31 (2014) (discussing contemporary racial disparities in capital 
punishment); G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death 
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Dehumanization might also fuel widespread acceptance of a 
pejorative social construct that portrays Latino immigrants or Latinos 
believed to be immigrants—as “illegal,”350 a socio-criminal status 
that reflects disgust and contempt. The dehumanization of 
undocumented persons includes children; they are “anchors” for 
citizenship, rather than babies.
351
 According to prevailing cultural 
narratives, Mexican women traffic fetal contraband to the United 
States because a live birth in the United States presumably will de-
illegalize their families.
352
 Gangs of unanchored Mexican juveniles 
enter the country in order to commit crimes, spread disease, and 
burden localities rather than to seek food, shelter, and subsistence.
353
 
 
Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 433–37 (2010) (discussing racial disparities in application of 
federal death penalty). 
 350. See Otto Santa Ana, “Like an Animal I Was treated”: Anti-Immigrant Metaphor in US 
Public Discourse, 10 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 191 (1999) (discussing pejorative language to 
describe Latino immigrants in print media, including use of the term “illegal alien”); Robert 
Short & Lisa Magaña, Political Rhetoric, Immigration Attitudes, and Contemporary Prejudice: 
A Mexican American Dilemma, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL., 701, 702–03 (2002) (“For example, if a 
Mexican immigrant has come to this country illegally, that person has, by definition, engaged in 
criminal behavior. Such a label makes it psychologically easier to discriminate against members 
of that ethnic group because one can do so under the guiding principle of being ‘anticrime,’ as 
opposed to ‘anti-Mexican’ or ‘anti-Latino.’ In short, this is the Mexican American dilemma: 
Sharing a phenotype (Latino) with a stigmatized other (illegal Mexican immigrants) renders one 
susceptible to prejudice and discrimination.”); Nicholas De Genova, The Legal Production Of 
Mexican/Migrant “Illegality”, 2 LATINO STUD. 160, 161 (2004) (“In this important sense, 
migrant ‘illegality’ is a spatialized social condition that is inseparable from the particular ways 
that Mexican migrants are likewise racialized as ‘illegal aliens’ – invasive violators of the law, 
incorrigible ‘foreigners,’ subverting the integrity of ‘the nation’ and its sovereignty from within 
the space of the US nation-state.”); id. (arguing that the law has played an “instrumental role in 
the production of a legally vulnerable undocumented workforce of ‘illegal aliens.’”). 
 351. See Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State And Local Anti-“Alien” Laws 
And Unity-Rebuilding Frames For Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 907 
(2011) (describing “anchor babies” as a “biologistic metaphor of anxiety over pregnant 
foreigners illegally entering the United States to implant babies who become birthright citizens 
able to petition for more foreign relatives to come” (citing Julia Preston, Citizenship as 
Birthright Is Challenged on the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at A8)). 
 352. Id. 
 353. See, e.g., Letter from Phil Gingrey, M.D., Georgia Republican Representative, to 
Thomas R. Frieden, M.D., M.P.H., Director of Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (July 
7, 2014), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Gingrey-
Letter-to-CDC-on-Public-Health-Crisis.pdf. Republican Representative Phil Gingrey of 
Georgia wrote the Center for Disease Control demanding that the agency address the health 
crisis of undocumented minors from Mexico and Central America who flocked to the United 
States seeking work during the summer of 2014. Id. Gingrey stated that he had heard “reports” 
of the adolescents carrying “swine flu, dengue fever, possibly Ebola virus and tuberculosis.” Id. 
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Mexican men have similar unlawful motives, and their “cantaloupe-
sized”354 calves prove this fact. Illegals come to the United States to 
do illegal things. This is a narrative of dehumanization—not fact. 
Dehumanization also affects Arabs and Muslims through the 
modern invention of the Arab-Muslim-Terrorist.
355
 This construct 
justifies many racially disparate practices, such as the heavy policing 
of Arabs, Muslims or people mistaken for Arabs or Muslims; United 
States militarism in the Middle East; denial of due process to criminal 
suspects; indefinite detention; drone attacks; and other 
questionable—if not unconstitutional—practices.356  
The problems associated with dehumanization existed historically, 
when explicit racism was culturally acceptable and legally enforced. 
Many of these same practices and resulting harms persist today—
despite the enactment of legal rules that mandate race-neutrality. 
Implicit bias theory can explain many of the severe racial disparities 
 
 354. See Juliet Lapidos, The Drug Mule-Cantaloupe Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013, 
5:45 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/the-drug-mule-cantaloupe-Crisis/?_ 
php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2. During a 
2013 interview and while immigration reform was a burning national issue, Representative 
Steve King, a Republican from Iowa, said, in reference to undocumented persons: “For every 
one who’s a valedictorian, there’s another 100 out there who weigh 130 pounds and they’ve got 
calves the size of cantaloupes because they’re hauling 75 pounds of marijuana across the 
desert.” Id. 
 355. Muniba Saleem & Craig A. Anderson, Arabs as Terrorists: Effects of Stereotypes 
Within Violent Contexts on Attitudes, Perceptions, and Affect, 3 PSYCHOL. OF VIOLENCE 84, 85 
(2013) (“Across [media] outlets, Arabs and Muslims are frequently linked with violence and 
terrorism, perpetuating the stereotype that Arabs and Muslims are terrorists.”); Kineret 
Guterman, The Dynamics of Stereotyping: Is a New Image of the Terrorist Evolving in 
American Popular Culture?, 25 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 640, 641 (2013) (“Today, it is 
almost impossible to bring up terrorism without bringing up Arabs and Muslims. Terrorism, 
Arabs, and Muslims are confused with each other so often both in the media and in the public 
mind that they have imperceptibly all begun to be thought of as different manifestations of the 
same thing.”). 
 356. See, e.g., P. J. Henry, Jim Sidanius, Shana Levin & Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance 
Orientation, Authoritarianism, and Support for Intergroup Violence Between the Middle East 
and America, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 569 (2005) (finding that persons with a higher social 
dominance orientation express greater support for United States militarism in the Middle East); 
Bart Bonikowski, Flying While Arab (Or Was It Muslim? Or Middle Eastern?): A Theoretical 
Analysis of Racial Profiling After September 11th, 7 DISCOURSE SOC. PRACTICE 315, 321 
(2005) (arguing that “racial profiling of Middle Eastern Americans” perpetuates and enforces “a 
discourse of the monstrous ‘Other’: the terrorist, the violent Muslim, the crude and savage 
Arab, the authoritarian subject incapable of self-governance” and it is an extension of 
“Orientalism . . . which has historically legitimated the [West’s] imperial encroachments on the 
territories of the Middle East”); see also supra note 218. 
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that exist within criminal law and enforcement. Group-based 
hierarchy, however, remains a central feature of American social 
relations.
357
 Furthermore, the law, including criminal law and 
enforcement, contribute to the maintenance of racial hierarchy. 
Accordingly, social dominance theory seems particularly relevant to 
research regarding racial inequality within contemporary criminal 
law and enforcement.  
C. The Complexity of Racial Inequality 
1. Resisting “Either/Or” Dichotomy 
Implicit bias theory does not provide a complete accounting of the 
sociology of racial inequality. Neither does social dominance theory. 
Because the perpetuation of racial inequality, including within 
criminal law and enforcement, results from numerous factors, 
scholars should resist the temptation to present one theory as 
comprehensive. Olatunde C. A. Johnson’s research regarding racial 
disparities in juvenile justice and other legal institutions counsels 
against a reductionist analysis of race and crime: 
[M]uch of how race operates and how disparities are generated 
by particular institutions is knowable. Decades of 
discrimination have created a social structure that shapes in 
distinctly racial terms where people live, their access to wealth 
and social welfare programs, their educational resources, and 
the networks and social capital that enable employment and 
 
 357. Henry A. Walker, Legitimacy and Inequality, in HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INEQUALITY, 353, 370 (Jane D. McLeod, Edward J. Lawler & Michael 
Schwalbe eds. 2014) (“Inequality is found at all levels of social organization from dyads to the 
community of nations.”). See generally Michael D. Yates, The Great Inequality, 10 MONTHLY 
REV. (2012) (discussing wealth and income inequality), http://monthlyreview.org/2012/03/ 
01/the-great-inequality/; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing substantive gender equality and criticizing law for adopting 
rules that do not help to ameliorate this form of social hierarchy); DALTON CONLEY, READING 
CLASS BETWEEN THE LINES (OF THIS VOLUME): A REFLECTION ON WHY WE SHOULD STICK TO 
FOLK CONCEPTIONS OF CLASS, IN, SOCIAL CLASS: HOW DOES IT WORK, 366 (Annette Lareau 
& Dalton Conley eds., 2008) (discussing social class hierarchy); Thomas Shapiro, BLACK 
WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995) (discussing 
convergence of race and poverty and historical forces that shaped poverty among blacks). 
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mobility. Much like recent efforts to understand gender- and 
race-based inequalities as a partial function of workplace 
structures, racial inequalities across a variety of social and 
economic areas can be addressed by understanding the specific 
ways in which government policies and practices interact with 
this social structure of race.
358
 
Johnson’s research demonstrates that individual discriminatory 
practices and the broader social structure in which group-based 
hierarchies exist should inform contemporary analysis of racial 
subjugation. Using implicit bias and social dominance theories could 
lead to the sophisticated analysis of race that Johnson persuasively 
advocates. Instead of either theory standing independently as the 
comprehensive understanding of racism in the United States, implicit 
bias and social dominance research should inform analyses of racial 
injustice. 
2. Working in Tandem: Implicit Bias and Social Dominance 
Implicit racial biases and SDO among whites contribute to the 
existence of contemporary racial inequality. The use of implicit bias 
and social dominance research by legal scholars and social scientists 
could enhance the quality of academic analysis of racism and 
potentially lead to the development of effective remedies to 
ameliorate the conditions of racial inequality. This is not to say that 
an excellent theory alone can change society. Instead, broad social 
change can only occur through a combination of social movement 
mobilization; support for change among elites, including politicians, 
judges, and corporations; substantial public support; and political 
opportunities.
359
 Nevertheless, the social and political actors who 
advocate broad social change often frame their agendas around 
messages that they communicate to constituents, opponents, media, 
 
 358. Johnson, supra note 258, at 384. 
 359. Scott Cummings & Douglas LeJaime, Lawyering For Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1235, 1312 (2010) (responding to legal theorists who contend that social movements 
overly rely upon litigation as a means of social change and describing the “multidimensional 
advocacy” LGBT social movements utilized to expand support for marriage equality). 
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and political actors.
360
 These frames can draw from academic 
theories, including principles related to democracy and the 
Constitution.
361
 Social movement actors may integrate implicit bias 
and social dominance theories within existing frames or create new 
ways of describing their agendas, in light of these theoretical 
developments.
362
 
Legal scholars who utilize social psychology research to elaborate 
the influence of race on legal institutions and actors have 
overwhelmingly chosen implicit bias theory and have neglected 
social dominance research. Social dominance theory, however, 
provides a more natural foundation for discussing race as a function 
of group-based social hierarchy. Implicit bias, on the other hand, is 
more suitable for analyzing individualized discrimination. The 
aggregate population of implicitly racially biased individuals could 
greatly impact the status of persons of color. Nevertheless, social 
dominance theory can explain why racial hierarchy continues to 
replicate itself despite dramatic shifts in cultural norms regarding the 
appropriateness of racial animus. 
Furthermore, social dominance theory goes to the heart of why 
race was initially created. Race was socially constructed to legitimize 
group-based domination, not simply to justify unconnected acts of 
discrimination against discrete individuals. Although individual 
discrimination undoubtedly contributes to racial hierarchy, the 
absence of social dominance theory in legal scholarship regarding 
races does not have a readily discernable justification. Ultimately, 
implicit bias and social dominance research could complement each 
other and permit a richer analysis of the ways in which law, including 
criminal law and enforcement, fortifies racial hierarchy.  
 
 360. See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: 
An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 611, 613–14 (2000) (discussing 
sociological meaning of “framing”). 
 361. See David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden & Robert D. Benford,  
Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,  51 Am. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 464, 469 (1986) (discussing social movement frames that draw from the 
Constitution and notions of democratic participation). 
 362. Id. at 472–76 (discussing modification or complete transformation of social movement 
frames). 
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The remainder of this Article provides specific examples for using 
implicit bias and social dominance research jointly to inform analysis 
of racism within criminal law and enforcement. Recent highly 
charged events involving the killing of unarmed black men by police 
officers and private citizens will serve as the context for weaving 
together implicit bias and social dominance theories in order to 
explain individual acts of racism and institutional racism within 
contemporary criminal law and enforcement.  
D. Applying the Theory: Florida v. George Zimmerman 
On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman, a Latino male, shot 
and killed Trayvon Martin, an eighteen-year-old black male.
363
 The 
incident occurred in Sanford, Florida—a city with a long history of 
racial inequality and discrimination.
364
 Martin’s death and the 
subsequent law enforcement response provide a rich opportunity to 
examine how both implicit bias and social dominance theories could 
explain the mistreatment of persons of color within criminal law and 
enforcement. 
1. The Death of Trayvon Martin 
On the night he died, Martin was visiting his father and was 
returning from a local convenience store carrying a bag of candy and 
a bottle of ice tea.
365
 Martin intended to watch the remainder of the 
NBA Championship game once he reached his father’s home.366 
Martin was also talking to a friend on his cellphone.
367
  
Unknown to Martin initially, Zimmerman was trailing him by car. 
Subsequently, Zimmerman called an emergency police operator to 
 
 363. Madison Gray, Trayvon Martin, One Year Later: Where We Are Now, TIMe (Feb. 26, 
2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/02/26/trayvon-martin-one-year-later-where-we-are-now/. 
 364. Id.; Tom Brown, Racist Past Haunts Florida Town Where Trayvon Died, REUTERS 
(Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/us-usa-florida-sanford-idUSBRE837 
06920120408. 
 365. Gray, supra note 363. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Serge F. Kovaleski, Martin Spoke of “Crazy and Creepy” Man Following Him, 
Friend Says (May 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/us/trayvon-martins-friend-
tells-what-she-heard-on-phone.html. 
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report that a black male was walking suspiciously through the 
neighborhood, that he “looked like he was up to no good,” and that 
he looked like he had been “using drugs.”368 The operator asked 
Zimmerman for his location, which he disclosed. Zimmerman then 
left his car. Suspecting that Zimmerman was now outside of his car, 
the operator asked him whether he was following Martin. 
Zimmerman said that he was. The operator, however, told 
Zimmerman that he should remain in his car until law enforcement 
arrived.
369
  
Zimmerman, however, viewed himself as a pseudo-law 
enforcement figure. He dreamed of becoming a cop, but this fantasy 
never became a reality.
370
 Nevertheless, Zimmerman often acted in 
ways that reflected his inner desire for the power that law 
enforcement officers possess. For example, Zimmerman took courses 
that introduced students to local law enforcement work.
371
 
Zimmerman acted as a pseudo-cop most directly, however, when he 
volunteered to work for the neighborhood watch program where he 
and Martin’s father lived.372 In this role, Zimmerman made at least 
forty-six calls to Sanford police primarily to report people he 
described as suspicious.
373
 According to media reports, many of the 
allegedly suspicious individuals Zimmerman reported to police were 
 
 368. CNN Wire Staff, Police: Trayvon Martin’s Death “Ultimately Avoidable,” CNN 
(May 18, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/17/justice/florida-teen-shooting/. 
 369. Id. 
 370. See Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Zimmerman Was a “Wannabe Cop” 
Who Profiled Trayvon Martin, Prosecutor Says in Closing Argument, CBS News (July 12, 
2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-zimmerman-trial-zimmerman-was-a-wannabe-cop-
who-profiled-trayvon-martin-prosecutor-says-in-closing-argument/; Pedro Oliveira, Jr., Trayvon’s 
Killer a Cop Wannabe on Paranoid Patrol, NY POST (Mar. 25, 2012), http://nypost.com/ 
2012/03/25/trayvons-killer-a-cop-wannabe-on-paranoid-patrol/ (“For more than a decade, 
George Zimmerman dreamed of a life in law enforcement—but instead of becoming a real cop, 
he lived out his big blue fantasy by tracking down stray dogs, “suspicious” children and other 
intruders in his gated Florida community.”). 
 371. Oliveira, supra note 370. 
 372. Susan Jacobson, Trayvon Martin: Zimmerman Was Not Following Neighborhood 
Watch “Rules,” Orlando Sentinel (Mar. 24, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-
24/news/os-trayvon-martin-neighborhood-watch-20120321_1_zimmerman-community-ties-
neighborhood-watch. 
 373. Bianca Prieto, Sheriff's Office Releases More 911 Calls Made by George Zimmerman, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 19, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-19/news/os-
trayvon-martin-shooting-george-zimmerman-911-20120319_1_neighborhood-county-sheriff-s-
office-crime-watch. 
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young black males.
374
 Prior to Martin’s death, some residents in the 
neighborhood reported having problems with Zimmerman’s 
aggressive monitoring.
375
  
Although the emergency police operator instructed Zimmerman to 
remain in his car, he decided to pursue Martin because he was upset 
that the “[f]ucking punks” or “assholes” “always get away.”376 At this 
point, the facts become somewhat murky. Within a few minutes of 
Zimmerman’s departure from his car, however, Martin was dead—
the victim of a gunshot wound to the chest inflicted by 
Zimmerman.
377
 Martin’s body was taken to a morgue before law 
enforcement officers notified his father the next day.
378
  
The responding lead detective believed that Zimmerman 
committed manslaughter.
379
 The local prosecutor, however, did not 
bring charges.
380
 The prosecutor’s decision not to charge Zimmerman 
with a crime provoked nationwide protests.
381
  Following intense 
media coverage and public outcry, Florida Governor Rick Scott 
appointed State’s Attorney Angela Corey to conduct a criminal 
investigation of Martin’s death.382 After reviewing the evidence, 
Corey charged Zimmerman with second-degree murder.
383
  
 
 374. See Oliveira supra note 372. 
 375. Trymaine Lee, George Zimmerman Neighbors Complained About Aggressive Tactics 
Before Trayvon Martin Killing, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2012/03/12/george-zimmerman-trayvon-martin_n_1340358.html. 
 376. Jelani Cobb, George Zimmerman’s Trial Begins, with a Knock-Knock Joke, THE NEW 
YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/george-zimmermans-
trial-begins-with-a-knock-knock-joke. 
 377. Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, Trayvon Martin Shooter Told Cops Teenager Went 
For His Gun, ABC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-shooter-
teenager-gun/story?id=16000239. 
 378. Daniel Trotta, Trayvon Martin: Before the World Heard the Cries, Reuters, REUTERS 
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-usa-florida-shooting-trayvon-
idUSBRE8320UK20120403. 
 379. Matt Gutman, Trayvon Martin Investigator Wanted Manslaughter Charge, ABC 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-investigator-wanted-charge-
george-zimmerman-manslaughter/story?id=16011674. 
 380. Id. 
 381. CNN Wire Staff, From coast to coast, protesters demand justice in Trayvon Martin 
case, CNN (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/26/justice/florida-teen-shooting-
events/. 
 382. Gov. Rick Scott Appoints Special Prosecutor for Trayvon Martin Case, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/gubernatorial/gov-rick-scott-
appoints-special-prosecutor-for-trayvon-martin-case/1221406. 
 383. Matt Gutman, Candace Smith & Pierre Thomas, George Zimmerman Charged With 
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2. Trayvon Martin and Racial Discourse 
Public opinion polls regarding Martin’s death split heavily along 
racial lines. Blacks overwhelmingly believed that Zimmerman was 
guilty of murder and that race was a factor in Martin’s death and the 
law enforcement response. Whites, on the other hand, were more 
likely to view Zimmerman as innocent and to believe that race was 
irrelevant to the incident.
384
  
Before Zimmerman’s criminal trial, Attorney General Eric Holder 
announced that the Department of Justice would investigate Martin’s 
death to determine whether the circumstances warranted a federal 
civil rights prosecution.
385
 This announcement provoked the ire of 
many conservatives, who contended that Holder was racist against 
whites.
386
 President Obama also angered many conservatives when, 
briefly addressing the controversy, he said “if I had a son, he’d look 
like Trayvon. . . . When I think about this boy, I think about my own 
kids.”387 Some commentators accused President Obama of fomenting 
 
2nd Degree Murder in Trayvon Martin’s Death, ABC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2012),  http://abcnews. 
go.com/US/george-zimmerman-charged-murder-trayvon-martin-killing/story?id=16115469. 
 384. Richard Faussett, U.S. Divided by Race in Trayvon Martin Case, Not on Deadly 
Force, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/13/nation/la-na-nn-
trayvon-martin-gun-rights-poll-20120413. Similar patters emerged after a jury acquitted 
Zimmerman. Gary Langer, Vast Racial Gap on Trayvon Martin Case Marks a Challenging 
Conversation, ABC NEWS (June 22, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/vast-
racial-gap-on-trayvon-martin-case-marks-a-challenging-conversation/.  
 385. ene Lynch, Trayvon Martin Case: Federal Charges Are Still A Possibility, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 11, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/11/nation/la-na-nn-trayvon-martin-case-
holder-20120411. 
 386. Indeed, an unnamed member of Zimmerman’s family sent a public letter to a 
conservative blog that accused Holder of racism for merely investigating Martin’s death, while 
he had not made a similar move with respect to the New Black Panthers, a black extremist 
group, that placed a bounty on Zimmerman’s life. Federal hate crimes legislation, however, 
does not cover such a scenario. For a full discussion of this letter, see Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, George Zimmerman “Relative” Calls Eric Holder A Racist; Grossly Misinterprets 
Federal Hate Crimes Law, DISSENTING JUSTICE (Apr. 9, 2012), http://dissentingjustice. 
blogspot.com/2012/04/george-zimmermans-wingnut-relative.html. See also Holder’s Black 
Panthers Blind Spot, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2012/apr/10/holders-black-panther-blind-spot/ (accusing Holder of being racist towards whites 
and pointing to his failure to enforce Florida criminal law, which is beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Justice, as evidence). 
 387. Krissah Thompson & Scott Wilson, Obama on Trayvon Martin: If I Had a Son, He’d 
Look Like Trayvon, WASH.  POST (Mar. 23, 2012),  http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
obama-if-i-had-a-son-hed-look-like-trayvon/2012/03/23/gIQApKPpVS_story.html?hpid=z1. 
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racial division.
388
 President Obama’s comments, however, were very 
guarded.
389
 Indeed, President Obama has consistently followed a very 
narrow and reserved strategy regarding race.
390
   
During Zimmerman’s criminal trial, Rachel Jeantel, the nineteen 
year-old friend with whom Martin was speaking when he 
encountered Zimmerman, testified for the prosecution. Jeantel said 
that Martin told her that Zimmerman, whom he described as a 
“creepy-ass cracker,” was following him.391 Jeantel also testified that 
she heard Martin say “[w]hy are you following me” and then a “hard-
breathing man,” presumably Zimmerman, ask “[w]hat you doing 
around here.”392 Finally, Jeantel testified that she heard Martin say 
“get off, get off.”  
Jeantel, however, did not perform well on cross-examination. She 
had difficulty answering some of the defense lawyer’s questions, and 
she struggled to express her thoughts.
393
 She appeared unable to read 
a portion of a transcript the defense lawyer gave her.
394
 Jeantel also 
seemed visibly exasperated by the number of questions the defense 
lawyers asked her to answer.
395
   
The jury of all women and nearly all whites (one juror was 
woman of color) acquitted Zimmerman of second-degree murder and 
manslaughter.
396
 The jury’s decision provoked many debates 
 
 388. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Fear of a Black President, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/09/fear-of-a-black-president/309064/ 
(discussing reaction among some conservative commentators to Obama’s statement about 
Trayvon Martin). 
 389. See Thompson & Wilson, supra note 396 (discussing Obama’s “calibrated” response 
to Trayvon Martin controversy). 
 390. Id.   
 391. Gene Demby, The Secret History of the Word “Cracker,” NPR (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/07/01/197644761/word-watch-on-crackers. 
 392. Seni Tienabeso & Matt Gutman, Trayvon Martin Told Friend About Man Following 
Him in Final Moments, ABC News (June 26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-
told-friend-man-final-moments/story?id=19490796. 
 393. See Jelani Cobb, Rachel Jeantel on Trial, THE NEW YORKER (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rachel-jeantel-on-trial. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Trial: Defense Grills Trayvon Martin’s Friend 
on Her Account of Phone Conversation, CBS New (June 27, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/george-zimmerman-trial-defense-grills-trayvon-martins-friend-on-her-account-of-phone-
conversation/. 
 396. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-
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regarding the soundness of the verdict.
397
 The decision also 
engendered a public discussion of race and crime that revealed deep 
chasms between people of color and whites regarding the 
significance of race to Zimmerman’s acquittal.398 The racially 
disparate opinions regarding the outcome of Zimmerman’s criminal 
trial, however, reflect broader disagreement among whites and people 
of color regarding the relevance of race in contemporary American 
society.
399
   
The racial discourse fell primarily into two camps. Blacks, other 
people of color, and political liberals generally believed that law 
enforcement, prosecutors, jurors, and Zimmerman actively 
discriminated on the basis of race to Martin’s detriment.400 Whites 
and political conservatives, however, dismissed race as a possible 
factor in either Martin’s death or the subsequent handling of the case 
by legal authorities and the jury.
401
 Some commentators who 
dismissed the significance of race to Martin’s death and 
Zimmerman’s acquittal contended that individuals who disagreed 
with this position fueled racial antagonism.
402
  
 
verdict-trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on the acquittal); Graham Winch, All-
Female Jury to Try Zimmerman, CNN (June 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/ 
justice/florida-zimmerman-trial/ (reporting racial composition of jury). 
 397. Compare Scott Neuman, Civil Rights Groups Call Zimmerman Verdict A 
“Miscarriage” (July 14, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/07/14/202058198/ 
civil-rights-groups-call-zimmerman-verdict-a-miscarriage (reporting negative reaction to 
Zimmerman’s acquittal among social justice advocates) with Richard Lempert, The George 
Zimmerman Trial: Virtues of an Acquittal, BROOKINGS (July 18, 2013), http://www.brookings. 
edu/research/opinions/2013/07/18-zimmerman-trayvon-martin-trial-lempert (“George Zimmerman 
was not proven guilty of either murder or manslaughter, and the jury, after some deliberation, 
reached the right result. If there is anything to celebrate about the trial, this is it. The system 
worked.”). 
 398. See Langer, supra note 391 (reporting racial opinion of Zimmerman’s acquittal) 
 399. See Eibach et al., supra note 14, at 453 (discussing opinion polls showing dramatic 
difference between black and white opinions regarding the existence of racial discrimination); 
Anderson et al., supra note 14 at 37 (summarizing different views whites and blacks hold with 
respect to the contemporary significance of racism); Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 919 & n.4 
(citing numerous studies finding dramatic differences among whites and persons of color 
regarding the ongoing significance of race). 
 400. Langer, supra note 391. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Bruce Thornton, Our Race-Hack President, FRONTPAGE MAG. (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2013/bruce-thornton/our-race-hack-president/ (arguing that 
Obama’s sympathetic comments to Trayvon Martin’s parents “reinforced all the race-hack 
rhetoric keeping this country racially divided and most blacks mired in social and economic 
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Both sides of this racial discourse offered inadequate analysis. 
The racial arguments regarding Martin’s death suffered because the 
race-bias and race-neutral camps treated racism in simplistic terms. 
They generally portrayed racism as the intentional and conscious 
actions by discrete individuals to inflict harm or disparate treatment 
upon a person of a different race. Both of these positions are 
unhelpful. The race-bias camp could not possibly demonstrate that 
every white person involved in the case acted with racial animus that 
cumulatively led to Zimmerman’s acquittal. On the other hand, the 
race-neutral side could not prove that race did not motivate any of the 
numerous whites involved in the incident. Both sides searched for a 
consciously racist perpetrator. Finding none, the race-neutrals 
declared that Zimmerman’s trial was fair and unaffected by race. The 
race-bias folks, however, contended that race was obviously a part of 
the decision-making—although neither the state actors nor 
Zimmerman made explicit statements that indisputably evinced racial 
animus.  
3. Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias 
Racial discrimination, as implicit bias research reveals, typically 
occurs due to nonconscious prejudice, rather than conscious animus. 
 
misery”). Thornton is a “Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Freedom Center, a Research Fellow 
at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, and a Professor of Classics and Humanities at the California 
State University.” Id. Gary DeMar, Two Black Teenagers Murder White Woman—Race 
Hustlers Nowhere to be Found, GODFATHER POLITICS (June 11, 2012), http://godfatherpolitics. 
com/5616/two-black-teenagers-murder-white-woman-race-hustlers-nowhere-to-be-found/#vse 
IDMPFXhuqoJSs.99 (“The Trayvon Martin shooting is a perfect example [of “race-baiting” by 
“so-called black leaders”]. Every day in America blacks kill other blacks, and in the case of the 
Cedartown woman, whites. The race baiters are nowhere to be found because there is no 
political capital and money to be made.”); Glenn Beck, Oprah’s Extreme Trayvon Comparison, 
GLENN BECK, http://www.glennbeck.com/2013/08/06/oprahs-extreme-trayvon-comparison/ 
(arguing that Oprah Winfrey’s drawing parallels between Martin and Emmitt Till lynching was 
“despicable”); Staff Article, Documents Obtained by Judicial Watch Detail Role of Justice 
Department in Organizing Trayvon Martin Protests, JUDICIAL WATCH (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/documents-obtained-by-judicial-watch-
detail-role-of-justice-department-in-organizing-trayvon-martin-protests/ (accusing Department 
of Justice of helping organize protests to prosecute Zimmerman, although DOJ’s role was to 
facilitate and mediate discussions to avoid community conflict). Many of these examples come 
from conservative blogs staffed by amateurs. Bruce Thornton, however, is a noted exception. 
See supra (discussing Thornton’s credentials).  
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Implicit bias can affect behavior even among individuals who 
subscribe to racial egalitarianism. The reality of implicit racial bias 
means that race could have impacted any moment of the Trayvon 
Martin tragedy, starting with his death and continuing to 
Zimmerman’s acquittal.   
Zimmerman could have believed Martin was planning a burglary 
or that he was under the influence of a drug due to racial stereotypes 
that construct men of color as dangerous and criminal.
403
 With 
respect to black men, Kathryn Russell-Brown’s research describes 
this pernicious stereotype as the “criminalblackman.”404 This same 
negative construct could have led whites in the United States 
generally to believe Zimmerman acted in self-defense.
405
 
Furthermore, the pervasiveness of implicit bias could also mean that 
some of the decisions by law enforcement officers and prosecutors 
resulted from nonconscious bias.
406
 Zimmerman’s acquittal could 
also demonstrate the operation of implicit racial biases among 
members of the jury. Martin’s race could have made Zimmerman’s 
assertion of self-defense more credible.
407
  
That Martin was a teenager did not spare him from implicit racial 
stereotyping. A recent study, for example, found that whites tend to 
overestimate the age of black children and do not view them as 
innocent, the way that children are typically seen. The study 
measured the implicit racial attitudes of a largely-white sample of 
police officers and an all-white sample of undergraduate students.
 408
 
Both samples overestimated the age of black children and rated them 
as being more culpable for criminal behavior than white or Latino 
 
 403. Lee, supra note 5, at 111 (“It is unlikely that Zimmerman would have thought Martin 
was ‘real suspicious,’ ‘up to no good,’ and ‘on drugs or something’ if Martin had been White. 
Race likely influenced Zimmerman’s perception that Martin posed a threat of criminality, 
whether Zimmerman was aware of this or not.”) 
 404. KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 3  (1998). 
 405. Lee, supra note 5, at 114 (arguing that disparate racial views regarding Trayvon 
Martin case likely result from differing racial perspectives among Americans). 
 406. Id. at 112–13 (arguing that race likely explains why Zimmerman initially did not face 
criminal charges). 
 407. Id. at 150–51 (discussing how racial stereotypes of the victim can impact the 
perceived reasonableness of a defendant asserting self-defense). 
 408. Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison, Lewis Di Leone, 
Carmen Marie Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of 
Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 528–30 (2014). 
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children.
409
 The age-estimation errors and culpability ratings were 
highest for black boys.
410
  
Other research confirms that young persons of color are often seen 
as being prone to criminality. One study tested implicit biases among 
police and probation officers who work with juvenile offenders. The 
study reveals that white police and probation officers tend to believe 
that young persons of color have a greater risk of reoffending than 
similarly situated whites.
411
 The participants also rated the criminal 
activity of juveniles of color as more serious than similar types of 
behavior of young white offenders. Implicit racial bias renders black 
children blameworthy, unsympathetic, and deserving of punishments 
reserved for adults.
412
 
The possible impact of implicit racial bias in Zimmerman’s 
acquittal becomes even more compelling in light of the specific facts 
regarding his pursuit of Martin. Zimmerman followed young Martin 
on a rainy night, in his car and on-foot; defied the instructions of the 
police dispatcher to remain in his car; said that he was upset that 
trouble-makers always get away; searched for Martin on foot; lost 
him; and within minutes returned to his car where Martin suddenly 
appeared and violently attacked him, despite the fact that Martin was 
simply walking home from a convenience store and talking to a 
friend on the phone. Implicit racial biases make this story plausible 
for many whites, including some whites who support racial 
egalitarianism. 
 
 409. Id. at 532. 
 410. Id. at 540. This research could explain why twenty-nine-year-old George Zimmerman 
overestimated Trayvon Martin’s age. During a court appearance, Zimmerman apologized to 
Martin’s parents and said that he did not realize Martin was just a teenager. Richard Fausset, 
George Zimmerman Apologizes to Trayvon Martin Family; Bond Set, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/20/nation/la-na-nn-george-zimmerman-bond-trayvon-
martin-20120420 (“I did not know how old he was. I thought he was a little bit younger than I 
am, and I did not know if he was armed or not.”). 
 411. Graham & Lowrey, supra note 327, at 483. 
 412. See Henning, supra note 29, at 419–26 (discussing impact of implicit bias upon young 
offenders of color); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial 
Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 483, 499 (2004) 
(“The results of these two studies offer new insights into the problem of racial disparities in the 
juvenile justice system. At least some of that disparity might be due to the unconscious racial 
stereotypes of those who determine the fate of offending youth.”). 
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4. Trayvon Martin and Social Dominance Theory 
The search for a consciously racist actor in the death of Trayvon 
Martin also distorts the institutional nature of racism and the 
subordination of persons of color within criminal law and 
enforcement. Social dominance theory holds that criminal law and 
enforcement are powerful instruments of group domination. Given 
the broader historical and contemporary context of race and crime in 
Florida and the United States, legal commentators should resist 
examining the legal and public response to Martin’s death solely as a 
manifestation of implicit racial bias. Martin’s death and 
Zimmerman’s acquittal raise serious questions about the inferior 
status of persons of color within criminal law and enforcement and 
the ongoing use of law as an instrument of social domination. 
As demonstrated by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Luke 
v. State,
413
 historically, Florida criminal law and enforcement 
explicitly discriminated on the basis of race.
414
 Furthermore, racial 
discrimination in Florida criminal law and enforcement constituted a 
critical part of a broader system of white supremacy. Racism within 
Florida criminal law and enforcement reminded the “degraded caste 
. . . of their inferior position” and of their “subjection to the authority 
of the free white citizens.”415  
After the Civil War, Florida, like other southern states, enacted 
Black Codes designed to reenslave blacks.
416
 During Reconstruction, 
blacks in Florida routinely experienced racial violence from 
whites.
417
 Whites used racial violence to maintain their social 
dominance.
418
 Despite the severity of anti-black violence, these 
 
 413. 5 Fla. 185 (1853). 
 414. Id. at 195–96. 
 415. Id. at 195. See also Joseph Conan Thompson, Toward a More Humane Oppression: 
Florida's Slave Codes, 1821–1861, 71 THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL Q. 324, 325–26 (1993) 
(discussing the race-based crimes and punishments contained in Florida’s Slave Codes). 
 416. For a discussion of Black Codes generally, see supra text accompanying notes 287–
95. For a discussion of Florida’s Black Codes, see Jerrell H. Shofner, Custom, Law, and 
History: The Enduring Influence of Florida’s “Black Code,” 55 THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL Q. 
277, 277–83 (1977).  
 417. See generally Ralph L. Peek, Lawlessness in Florida, 1868–1871, 40 THE FLORIDA 
HISTORICAL Q. 164 (1961) (discussing widespread racial violence in Florida during 
Reconstruction Era). 
 418. Id. at 164 (“In this bloody struggle the issue at stake was the possession of local, state, 
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crimes were largely unpunished.
419
 Whites harassed, threatened, and 
used actual violence to retain their social dominance.
420
 Also, virulent 
racism among whites and the disenfranchisement of blacks meant 
that lawlessness among whites received broad support from most of 
the electorate.
421
  
Following Reconstruction, blacks continued to suffer horrible 
abuses in Florida. In the late-nineteenth century until the mid-1940s, 
many black Floridians were lynched for alleged criminal activity or 
for simply not deferring to whites.
422
 Florida had the highest rate of 
lynching among all of the states in the Deep South.
423
 Also, lynching 
in Florida, as elsewhere, largely went unpunished.
424
 Lynching was 
 
and national political and economic power, and this issue was colored and made more complex 
by social and racial elements, including the most virulent race hatred.”). 
 419. Id. at 165. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Paul Ortiz painstakingly details post-Reconstruction racial violence in Florida in his 
excellent work Emancipation Betrayed. See PAUL ORTIZ, EMANCIPATION BETRAYED: THE 
HIDDEN HISTORY OF BLACK ORGANIZING AND WHITE VIOLENCE IN FLORIDA FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE BLOODY ELECTION OF 1920 (2006); see also Jack E. Davis, 
“Whitewash” in Florida: The Lynching of Jesse James Payne and Its Aftermath, 68 THE 
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUART. 277 (1990) (discussing 1945 lynching of Jesse James Payne, 
which occurred nearly twenty years after lynching had greatly subsided and lost favor in the rest 
of the nation); Jerrell H. Shofner, Judge Herbert Rider and the Lynching at Labelle, 59 THE 
FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUART. 292 (1981) (discussing lynching of Henry Patterson in 1926 in 
LaBelle, Florida); Walter T. Howard, Vigilante Justice and National Reaction: The 1937 
Tallahassee Double Lynching, 67 THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL Q.  292 (1981) (discussing the 
1937 lynching of Richard Ponder and Ernest Hawkins in Tallahassee, Florida); Joshua 
Youngblood, “Haven’t Quite Shaken the Horror”: Howard Kester, the Lynching of Claude 
Neal, and Social Activism in the South During the 1930s, 86 THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL Q. 3 
(2007) (discussing 1934 lynching of Claude Neal in Greenwood, Florida).  
 423. Davis, supra note 444, at 277 (observing that “by 1920 [Florida] had the nation’s 
highest lynching rate relative to its population”); WALTER HOWARD, LYNCHINGS: EXTRALEGAL 
VIOLENCE IN FLORIDA DURING THE 1930S, 15 (2005) (observing that “in the 1930s . . . Florida 
was the most lynch-prone state in the South”); STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL 
OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882–1930, at 37 (1995)  (reporting 
that Florida blacks were most vulnerable to lynching). 
 424. Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and 
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEM. 31, 31–32 (1996) (“Despite the notoriety of 
[lynching] and the fact that the perpetrators were often well-known to the community, the 
lynching of a black person by a white mob was rarely investigated, even more rarely 
prosecuted, and almost never punished”); id. at 40 (observing that “only about eight-tenths of 
one percent of the lynchings in the United States since 1900 have been followed by convictions 
for the perpetrators” compared with a rate of “forty-four percent” for “regular homicides during 
the same period”). 
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very popular among southern whites, who, unlike blacks, could 
vote.
425
 Even if elected officials in the South wanted to suppress 
lynching and provide justice for the victims, they knew that their 
efforts would come with serious political risks.
426
 Furthermore, many 
white office holders, including law enforcement officials, shared 
whites’ general desire for racial domination, and the unpunished 
lynching of blacks perpetuated white supremacy.
427
 Indeed, law 
enforcement officials often willingly turned over blacks to lynch 
mobs or actively participated in lynchings.
428
 During the Progressive 
Era, black lives simply did not matter in the South.   
Because states offered very little refuge for blacks from lynch 
mobs, antilynching activists turned to the federal government. From 
1882 to 1951 opponents of lynching in Congress introduced over one 
hundred bills to ban mob violence in the states.
429
 Despite these 
efforts and the systematic refusal of southern states to protect blacks 
from white mob violence, Congress failed to pass antilynching 
legislation.
430
  
Southern whites, including Floridians, also used violence to eject 
blacks from their land and livelihoods. In January 1923, whites killed 
at least six blacks in the all-black unincoporated area of Rosewood, 
Florida.
431
 The violence began after a white woman in a neighboring 
town alleged that a black man had raped her.
432
 A group of white 
 
 425. Id. at 41. 
 426. Id. 
 427. See Howard, supra note 423, at 28 (“The prevalence of lynching in Florida between 
1880 and 1930, though progressively declining, reveals that whites in this former slave state 
resorted to such extralegal tactics primarily to intimidate and control a large minority 
population so as to perpetuate white supremacy, maintain Jim Crow customs and laws, and 
discipline black communities.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System 
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Approach, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 274 (2007) 
(“The public torture of blacks accused of offending the racial order demonstrated whites’ 
unlimited power and blacks’ utter worthlessness. This nation’s rights, liberties, and justice were 
meant for white people only; blacks meant nothing before the law.”); id. (“Lynchings were not 
exceptions to the law; they were extensions of the inequitable formal administration of justice 
and part of a broader system of racial control.”). 
 428. Holden-Smith, supra note 424, at 40. 
 429. Id. at 44. 
 430. Id. 
 431. R. THOMAS DYE, ROSWEOOD, FLORIDA: THE DESTRUCTION OF AN AFRICAN 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY, 58 THE HISTORIAN 605 (1996). 
 432. Id. at 611. 
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men, including the county sheriff, used scenting dogs to search for 
the alleged assailant. Although the white vigilantes could not locate 
the alleged rapist, they pursued blacks whom they believed might 
have harbored him.
433
 The sheriff had to take one man into custody in 
order to prevent a lynching.
434
 The mob, however, stopped another 
black man in Rosewood and accused him of secreting the alleged 
rapist.
435
 The mob then tied the individual to a tree and shot and 
mutilated him.
436
  
At this point, the violence escalated. Operating on rumors 
regarding the location of the alleged assailant, a mob of twenty to 
thirty whites converged on the home of another Rosewood family and 
kicked down the front door.
437
 The black residents, however, were 
prepared to defend themselves. Two whites were killed during an 
ensuing gun battle.
438
 The vigilantes retreated after they exhausted 
their ammunition.
439
  
The white mob’s defeat represented a serious breach of Jim Crow 
customs. Black self-defense constituted a paramount challenge to 
white supremacist rule.
440
 As news of the gun battle and brazen black 
resistance spread, two hundred whites from neighboring cities 
converged upon Rosewood in order to restore white dominion.
441
 For 
two weeks, white vigilantes committed acts of violence against 
blacks in Rosewood.
442
 They acted indiscriminately.
443
 They also 
burned down every black-owned home. Blacks fled the city on foot 
and by trains operated by sympathetic white conductors.
444
 Officially, 
 
 433. Id. at 612. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 614–15. 
 438. Id. at 615.  
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. (“The idea that blacks in Rosewood had taken up arms against the white race was 
unthinkable in the Deep South.”); id. at 621 (“When blacks sought protection against this 
climate of violence by arming themselves, whites viewed their response as a direct threat to the 
very nature of southern society.”). 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. at 618. 
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two whites and six blacks died during the mayhem, but some 
survivors contend that many others lost their lives.
445
  
Rosewood was never rebuilt, and Levy County, in which the town 
was located, became primarily white due to the mass exodus of 
blacks.
446
 The Rosewood riots destroyed a once-thriving black 
community.
447
 And like many participants in acts of racial violence in 
the South, the perpetrators of the Rosewood riots escaped 
punishment. The local prosecutor convened an all-white grand jury 
that declined to return any indictments.
448
 Florida law enforcement 
officials never arrested or prosecuted anyone for this violent racial 
atrocity.
449
 In 1994, however, the Florida legislature passed a bill that 
provided reparations for Rosewood’s black families and their 
descendants to compensate them for their loss of property.
450
  
The history of lynching and tragedies like Rosewood demonstrate 
that legal authorities in Florida allowed whites to kill blacks with 
impunity during the Jim Crow era. Black criminality directed towards 
whites, however, received very brutal responses from state and 
private actors. White supremacy compelled harsh punishments for 
blacks who actually or allegedly harmed whites. White racial 
domination, however, meant that black life was unworthy of 
protection. 
Today, Florida criminal law continues to inflict group harms upon 
persons of color. Empirical studies demonstrate that blacks and 
Latinos receive longer sentences than white offenders who commit 
similar crimes.
451
 Black men and women are particularly vulnerable 
to longer sentences in Florida due to prosecutorial decisions to pursue 
available sentencing enhancements, such as habitual offender 
penalties.
452
 The disparate treatment of persons of color within 
Florida criminal law and enforcement has seriously curtailed the 
ability of blacks to participate in the political process. A March 2014 
 
 445. Id. at 619–20. 
 446. Id. at 621–22. 
 447. Id. at 608–11. 
 448. Id. at 620. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. at 605. 
 451. See Crawford, supra note 257. 
 452. See Caravelis et al., supra note 258. 
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report submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee found that the rate of felon disenfranchisement in 
Florida is “the highest and most racially disparate in the U.S.”453  1.5 
million Floridians cannot vote due to felony convictions.
454
 Felon 
disenfranchisement policies prevent twenty-three percent of voting-
age black Floridians from exercising political rights.
455
 A criminal 
conviction imposes additional burdens upon ex-offenders, including 
employment discrimination and exclusion from juries.
456
 Although 
past convictions harm most job seekers, research shows that the harm 
is most acute for people of color.
457
 Also, recent research finds that 
incarceration causes long term negative health effects that remain 
with inmates after they are released.
458
 In jurisdictions where people 
of color suffer higher rates of incarceration, imprisonment could 
diminish the overall health of communities of color.
459
  
Criminal convictions also harm families and other dependents of 
the offenders. Empirical research, for example, finds that paternal 
incarceration is strongly linked with child homelessness.
460
 
Homelessness has tremendous implications for the economic and 
physical well-being of children. Homeless children suffer higher rates 
of “victimization” and “exposure to infectious disease”; they have 
 
 453. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE FOURTH PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Mar. 2014, available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CCPR_CSS_USA
_16508_E.doc. 
 454. Steve Bousquet, Tampa Woman Champions Floridians’ Right to Vote, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2013.  
 455. Id. 
 456. See Alexander, supra note 333, at 191–92, 193–94. 
 457. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AMER. J. OF SOC. 937, 957–60 
(2003). 
 458. Jason Schnittker, Michael Massoglia & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and the 
Health of the African American Community, 8 DU BOIS REV. 133, 138 (2011) (“A growing 
body of research suggests that, on balance, incarceration increases the risk for poor health.”). 
 459. Id. at 137 (“The unusually high prevalence of incarceration among African Americans 
relative to Whites allows for the possibility that incarceration can actually account for some 
portion of the racial disparity in health.”). 
 460. Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration, Child Homelessness, and the Invisible 
Consequences of Mass Imprisonment, 651 ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. 
SCI. 74, 75 (2014). 
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“little access to health care”; a higher “risk of mortality relative to 
housed children”; and a harder time completing their education.461 
Homeless children also have greater risk of “abuse” and “suffer more 
mental health problems than other children.”462 Collectively, these 
problems can have devastating effects on the economic opportunities 
of homeless children as they transition into adulthood.
463
  
Paternal incarceration also causes serious problems for the mother 
of the incarcerated individual’s child or children. Research shows that 
mothers of children with incarcerated fathers are more susceptible to 
major depression and greater life dissatisfaction.
464
 These results are 
exacerbated by poverty but exist regardless of socioeconomic 
status.
465
  
Maternal incarceration appears to have a strong negative impact 
on a child’s educational completion. One study found that maternal 
incarceration substantially lowers the likelihood of a child completing 
college.
466
 Paternal incarceration caused similar, but less pronounced 
effects.
467
 Children of incarcerated mothers have higher rates of high-
school drop-out and lower levels of college attendance. The impact of 
paternal incarceration upon educational outcomes was not as strongly 
correlated as maternal incarceration.
468
  
And with particular relevance to the Trayvon Martin tragedy, 
Florida criminal law and enforcement disproportionately impacts 
youth of color. Children who attend Florida public schools receive 
disparate punishments for school behavioral infractions. These 
punishments can include suspensions, expulsions, transfer to 
 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. (“These effects are relevant not only for contemporary inequality in homelessness 
among children but also for future inequality in civic preparedness and political participation 
among these children as they become adults.”). 
 464. Christopher Wildeman, Jason Schnittker, & Kristin Turney, Despair by Association? 
The Mental Health of Mothers with Children by Recently Incarcerated Fathers, 77 AMER. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 216, 234 (2012). 
 465. Id. 
 466. John Hagan & Holly Foster, Children of the American Prison Generation: Student 
and School Spillover Effects of Incarcerating Mothers, 46 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 37, 57-58 
(2012). 
 467. Id. at 58. 
 468. Id.  
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alternative education programs, and criminal charges.
469
 Studies find 
that race impacts the rate and severity of punishment.
470
 This pattern 
mirrors national data.
471
 Black male students are more acutely 
impacted by school disciplinary policies; black disabled male 
students are the most negatively affected.
472
  
Many students can face criminal charges for behavioral 
infractions, and law enforcement often becomes involved in very 
minor cases. According to an Orlando Sentinel report, in 2012  
Florida arrested 12,000 students a total of 14,000 times for school 
infractions.
473
 Of those arrests, a total of 67 percent were for 
misdemeanors.
474
 And less than 5 percent involved weapons 
charges.
475
   
The racial disparities in school discipline can seriously impact the 
well-being of communities of color. Studies show that criminal and 
noncriminal sanctions for school misconduct diminish academic 
performance and school attendance, reduce the likelihood that a child 
will graduate from high school, increase student disengagement from 
school, and enhance the likelihood that the child will engage in 
criminality as an adult.
476
   
 
 469. See FLORIDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA: DISCIPLINE PRACTICES LEAVE MANY CHILDREN 
BEHIND 9–12 (2010) (discussing racially disparate school discipline policies such as office 
referrals, suspension, expulsion, and transfer to alternative schools within Duval County, 
Florida) [hereinafter SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA].  
 470. SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA, supra note 496, at 9–12. 
 471. Russell J. Skiba, Robert H. Horner, Choong-Geun Chung & M. Karega Rausch, Race 
Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of African American and Latino Disproportionality in 
School Discipline, 40 SCHOOL PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 95-103 (2011) (finding black and Latino 
students more harshly punished than whites for same school behavior infractions); Tamar 
Lewin, Black Students Face More Discipline, Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/education/black-students-face-more-harsh-discipline-data-
shows.html (reporting substantial disproportionality in punishment among blacks, Latinos and 
whites, with particularly high disparities among black and Latino children with disabilities). 
 472. See Lewin, supra note 471.  
 473. Leslie Postal & Lauren Roth, Thousands of Student Arrests Alarm Florida Justice 
Leaders, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 10, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-02-10/ 
features/os-school-arrests-florida-prison-pipeline-20130209_1_school-arrests-disabled-students 
-juvenile-justice. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
 476. See Alicia Darensbourg, Erica Perez & Jamilia J. Blake, Overrepresentation of 
African American Males in Exclusionary Discipline: The Role of School-Based Mental Health 
Professionals in Dismantling the School to Prison Pipeline, 1 J. OF AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES 
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Viewed systematically, criminal law and enforcement in Florida 
disproportionately deprive persons of color of freedom from physical 
restraint and their ability to vote. Florida criminal law and 
enforcement also lock persons of color in poverty due to the harsh 
educational and economic consequences of convictions. Numerous 
aspects of Florida criminal law and enforcement subordinate persons 
of color. The historical use of criminal law and enforcement to 
achieve racial domination counsels against an analysis of Martin’s 
death and Zimmerman’s acquittal that primarily searches for biased 
individuals or that dismisses the relevance of race altogether. 
Furthermore, given the institutional nature of racism, the elements 
of race that impacted Martin’s life extend far beyond his particular 
situation and implicate a variety of criminal justice practices 
throughout the United States. Implicit bias research alone cannot 
address the breadth of racial injustice caused by criminal law and 
enforcement. Social dominance theory, by contrast, permits the 
institutional analysis of racism needed to explain why Martin’s death 
and the law enforcement response made blacks vulnerable 
nationwide. Social dominance theory could also provide a rich 
 
IN EDUC. 196, 199 (2010) (observing that “research . . . indicates that involvement in 
exclusionary discipline leads to feelings of alienation from school, elevated dropout rates, and 
alarming incarceration rates”); Nancy A. Heitzeg, Education or Incarceration: Zero Tolerance 
Policies and the School to Prison Pipeline,” 9 FORUM ON PUB. POL’Y 1 (2009) (“Increased 
drop-out rates are directly related to the repeated use of suspension and expulsion.”); Emily 
Arcia, Achievement and Enrollment Status of Suspended Students Outcomes in a Large, 
Multicultural School District, 38 EDUC. AND URB. SOC’Y 359, 367 (2006) (finding that 
suspensions correlate with diminished future academic achievement and higher drop-out rates); 
Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court 
Involvement, 23 JUSTICE Q. 462, 477 (2006) (“First, first-time court appearance during high 
school is more detrimental for education outcomes than first-time arrest without a court 
appearance.”); id. at 478 (finding that “court appearance hinders educational attainment, 
increasing the probability of dropout” and that “[h]igh school dropout, in turn, may set in 
motion a number of negative outcomes including unemployment and increased criminal 
involvement”); Linda M. Raffaele Mendez, Predictors of Suspension and Negative School 
Outcomes: A Longitudinal Investigation, 90 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 17, 
26 (2003)  (“School suspension correlates significantly with a host of negative outcomes, 
including students’ poor academic achievement, grade retention, delinquency, dropping out, 
disaffection and alienation, and drug use.”); Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen, Defining and 
Redirecting a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 99 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 9, 
11 (2003) (discussing positive correlation between lack of high school graduation and future 
incarceration); id. (“The single largest predictor of later arrest among adolescent females is 
having been suspended, expelled, or held back during the middle school years.”).  
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empirical context for existing works within legal theory that view 
criminal law and enforcement as sites of racial subordination.
477
  
E. A Second Application: The Killing of Michael Brown 
During the completion of this Article, a series of incidents 
involving race and crime became media sensations. These incidents 
include the killing of several unarmed black males by whites who 
were not punished for the homicides they committed.
478
 One incident 
that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri, occupied national attention for 
several months in 2014.  
On August 9, 2014, Darren Wilson, a white police officer in 
Ferguson, shot and killed Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-old black 
male.
479
 Like the killing of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown’s death 
became a social media sensation and received intense scrutiny in the 
national media.
480
 Brown’s body lay in the street where he was shot 
for over four hours.
481
 Protestors gathered and demanded information 
from the Ferguson police department, but officials resisted providing 
the public any details regarding the shooting, including the name of 
the officer who shot Brown.
482
 The perceived resistance of Ferguson 
officials caused anger among many activists in Missouri and across 
the nation.
483
 
 
 477. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 333 (discussing contemporary incarceration of 
blacks as the reestablishment of Jim Crow); Roberts, supra note 450, at 283 (“Mass 
imprisonment, capital punishment, and police terror are not universally associated with racial 
subjugation. But these barbaric practices can be traced to the enslavement of Africans in the 
United States and their endurance in modern America serves to sustain the racial order.). 
 478. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
 479. Julie Bosman & Joseph Goldstein, Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a 
Ferguson Street, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/michael-
brown-a-bodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html?_r=0. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. 
 482. Julie Bosman & Timothy Williams, Missouri Police Cite Threats in Deciding Not to 
Name Officer Who Shot Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
08/13/us/ferguson-police-cite-safety-risk-in-decision-not-to-name-officer-in-shooting.html. 
 483. Jon Swaine, Rory Carroll & Amanda Holpuch, Ferguson Police Release Name of 
Officer Who Shot Michael Brown, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2014/aug/15/ferguson-police-darren-wilson-michael-brown-shooting (observing that 
the lack of information from police contributed to “disgruntlement” of protesters). 
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1. Implicit Bias and Ferguson 
The Ferguson police alleged that Officer Darren Wilson 
confronted Brown for “walking down the middle of the street”484 and 
that a physical confrontation occurred which led to the shooting.
485
 
Witnesses disputed this account.
486
 Police later released a statement 
that reported Brown was involved in a convenience store robbery 
shortly before Wilson confronted him.
487
 Wilson, however, had no 
knowledge of the alleged robbery or Brown’s supposed 
participation.
488
 It is plausible that police released this information in 
order to activate implicit stereotypes that associate black men and 
criminal activity. People who had previously believed that Brown 
was possibly responsible for his own death could now find him 
culpable because they knew he was just another black male criminal. 
2. Social Dominance and Ferguson    
Brown’s death led to massive of protests in Ferguson and around 
the nation.
489
 In response to protests in Ferguson, local police utilized 
military weapons and vehicles, along with tear gas, riot gear, and 
other armaments, to subdue the protestors.
490
 To many observers, this 
dramatic display of force did not seem proportional to any risks the 
protestors presented.
491
 But the protestors threatened more than 
tranquility. They also challenged perceived white supremacist police 
 
 484. Julie Bosman & Alan Blinder, Midnight Curfew in Effect for Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. 
 487. Swaine et al., supra note 516. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Catherine E. Shoichet, Ben Brumfield &Tristan Smith, Tear Gas Fills Ferguson’s 
Streets Again, CNN  (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/13/us/missouri-teen-
shooting/.  
 490. Id.; Matthew Daly, Eric Tucker & Robert Burns, Military Gear on Ferguson Police 
Piques Concern in Washington, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www. 
pbs.org/newshour/rundown/military-gear-ferguson-police-piques-concern-washington/; Jamelle 
Bouie, The Militarization of the Police: It’s Dangerous and Wrong to Treat Ferguson Like a 
War Zone, SLATe (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/ 
2014/08/police_in_ferguson_military_weapons_threaten_protesters.html.  
 491. See Bouie, supra note 489. 
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practices.
492
 The police conduct took place within a broader context 
of historical and contemporary racism in Missouri. Data reported 
after Brown’s death reveals a strong likelihood that Ferguson police 
racially profile blacks. In 2013, for example, blacks constituted 86 
percent of traffic stops and ninety-two percent of vehicle searches 
subsequent to a traffic stop.
493
 Blacks, however, only constitute 67 
percent of Ferguson’s population.   
A New York Times article reports numerous other sources of racial 
conflict within Ferguson.
494
 Although blacks constitute two-thirds of 
the Ferguson population, whites dominate positions of political 
power in the city. The mayor of Ferguson is white, as are five of the 
six city council members.
495
 All seven of Ferguson’s school board 
members are white, and they caused a controversy in 2013 when they 
fired a black school superintendent without providing a reason.
496
 In 
2013, the police department in nearby St. Louis fired a lieutenant 
because he ordered officers to profile blacks in shopping districts.
497
 
Furthermore, historically, Missouri was a slave state that remained 
segregated following emancipation.
498
 Indeed, Missouri was the 
setting for Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which a slave unsuccessfully 
sought judicial relief from slavery.
499
 
The history of white domination in Missouri seems highly 
relevant in Ferguson today. Black defiance to whites’ social 
dominance triggered a powerful militaristic display by local 
authorities. As leading social dominance theorists Sidanius and Pratto 
 
 492. Tanzina Vega & John Eligon, Deep Tensions Rise to the Surface After Ferguson 
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/us/ferguson-mo-
complex-racial-history-runs-deep-most-tensions-have-to-do-police-force.html.  
 493. Alexis C. Madrigal, How Much Racial Profiling Happens in Ferguson?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/how-
much-racial-profiling-happens-in-ferguson/378606/. 
 494. See Vega & Eligon, supra note 492. 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. 
 498. See PAUL FINKLEMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER 
CONTROVERSIAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 24 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2007) (discussing 
Dred Scott and Missouri history and politics); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex and 
Missouri Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Kramer in a Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L. REV. 
673 (1989) (discussing numerous influential cases challenging slave law and post-bellum racial 
segregation in Missouri). 
 499. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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predict, however, “systematic terror is likely to be most ferocious 
when subordinates directly challenge and confront the hegemonic 
control of dominants.”500 The powerful police response to Ferguson 
protestors and the possible racist motivation that led to Brown’s death 
strongly suggest that in post-racial America, there remains an 
“obvious propriety in visiting [blacks’] offences with more degrading 
punishment than is inflicted on the white citizens.”501  
Subsequently, a grand jury of three blacks and nine whites 
declined to indict Wilson. This decision led to additional protests. 
Many commentators argued that the prosecutor on the case took 
extraordinary efforts to make sure that the grand jury did not indict 
Wilson, including cross-examining prosecution witnesses, calling 
Wilson to testify, softly questioning Wilson in order to avoid 
undermining his credibility, and presenting evidence that exculpated 
Wilson.
502
 These arguments seem plausible given the evidence in the 
case and the typical ease that prosecutors enjoy securing grand jury 
indictments.
503
 The prosecutor’s efforts to avoid an indictment 
validate the subordination of blacks through police violence. The 
prosecutor’s actions also resemble historical practices that 
immunized white racial violence from punishment.  
In addition, Wilson made a comment during his grand jury 
testimony that strongly suggests a motivation rooted in social 
dominance. Wilson testified that he decided to shoot Brown because 
“[h]e looked up at me and had the most intense aggressive face. . . . 
The only way I can describe it, it looks like a demon. That’s how 
 
 500. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 50, at 41. 
 501. Luke, 5 Fla. at 195. 
 502. Kimberly Kindy & Carol D. Leonnig, In Atypical Approach, Grand Jury in Ferguson 
Shooting Receives Full Measure of Case, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.washington 
post.com/politics/in-atypical-approach-grand-jury-in-ferguson-shooting-receives-full-measure-
of-case/2014/09/07/1dec6ffe-339b-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.html; Jeffrey Fagan & 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers for Columbia Law School Students 
about Grand Juries (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_ 
events/2014/november2014/Facts-on-Ferguson-Grand-Jury; Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a 
Grand Jury, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-
grand-jury. 
 503. Ben Casselman, It’s Incredibly Rare For A Grand Jury To Do What Ferguson’s Just 
Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ferguson-michael-
brown-indictment-darren-wilson/. 
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angry he looked.”504 Wilson also offered testimony that invokes racial 
stereotypes of black men as dangerous, lawless, and violent:  
Very aggressive. Um, he is I don’t really know how to describe 
it. Um, he turns. I looked at his face. It was just intense. It was. 
I’ve never seen anybody look that, for lack of a better words, 
crazy, I’ve never seen that. I mean, it was very aggravated, um, 
aggressive, hostile. Just, you couldn’t, you could, you could 
tell he was lookin’ through ya. There was nothing he was 
seeing . . .
505
 
Dehumanization and social dominance are intertwined.
506
 Wilson’s 
testimony reveals the white supremacist nature of Brown’s killing. 
Brown was demonic, aggressive, hostile, and angry. Brown was so 
vile that his manner was unfamiliar to Wilson—who presumably had 
encountered dangerous criminals during his career. Wilson had no 
other choice but to kill Brown.  
Because Wilson described Brown as a demon, rather than a 
teenager, members of the grand jury could have believed his 
statement that he needed to use lethal force. This outcome is 
consistent with a history of racial subordination. The social 
construction of blacks as violent savages has justified violent racial 
repression throughout American history. That history resonates in 
Brown’s death and Wilson’s freedom from punishment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that implicit racial biases and social 
domination both contribute to the existence of racial hierarchy in the 
United States. Antidiscrimination law, however, only finds 
culpability when individuals purposefully act with racial animus. 
Racial animus is difficult to prove because racial stereotypes 
 
 504. Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Wilson Said the Unarmed Teen Looked Like a “Demon”: 
Experts Say His Testimony Was Dehumanizing and “Super-Humanizing,” WASH. POST (Nov. 
25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/25/wilson-said-the-
unarmed-teen-looked-like-a-demon-experts-say-his-testimony-was-dehumanizing-and-super-
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typically exist nonconsciously. Yet these implicit racial attitudes can 
and do influence behavior. Courts and lawmakers, however, 
immunize racial discrimination from legal invalidation because they 
refuse to refashion the law to address the pervasiveness of implicit 
bias. 
Group-based social hierarchy also remains a central feature of 
racism in the United States. Social dominance theory illustrates how 
criminal law and enforcement perpetuate the subordination of persons 
of color. The same impulse that fueled racist criminal law and 
enforcement in the past—the desire to maintain white supremacy—
continues to affect law and policy today. Individual people alone do 
not cause racial subordination. Instead, powerful groups and 
institutions structure race relations. 
The killing of Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown and similar 
recent incidents demonstrate that implicit biases make persons of 
color vulnerable to acts of individual violence. An individuated 
analysis of the deaths of Martin and Brown and the innocence of their 
killers, however, does not comprehensively explain these tragedies. 
These incidents demonstrate that criminal law and enforcement 
continue to perpetuate racial subordination. In other words, these 
homicides, although perpetrated by individuals, are not isolated 
events. Instead, they constitute acts of institutional racism that 
support the maintenance of white supremacy. 
 Legal scholars who use social science literature such as implicit 
bias theory to supply an empirical foundation for racial justice 
advocacy should also engage scholarship, such as social dominance 
theory, that analyzes group-based social hierarchy. Because social 
dominance theory addresses the structural nature of inequality, this 
research could enhance legal scholarship regarding contemporary 
racism and lead to more helpful policies designed to ameliorate the 
conditions of racial hierarchy.  
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